Top Photo: Firemen at work in bomb damaged street in London, after Saturday night raid, circa 1941. New York Times Paris Bureau Collection. National Archives

After the fall of France in June 1940, Great Britain stood alone in Europe against Nazi Germany’s offensives. Shortly thereafter, in what became known as the “Battle of Britain,” the skies over southern England were filled with large formations of aircraft, swirling contrails, and damaged planes trailing smoke spiraling to the ground. From summer 1940 until the following spring, the Royal Air Force’s (RAF) Fighter Command successfully countered the German air offensive using the world’s first complex integrated air defense system. While the RAF fought in the skies overhead, British civilians in towns of southern England endured regular visits from German Heinkel, Junkers, and Dornier bombers. In what came to be known as “the Blitz,” British civilians endured the Luftwaffe’s attacks on infrastructure, production centers, military targets, and national morale. Often told as part of WWII lore as a tale of dogged resistance, British subjects’ actions during the Blitz were surprisingly pragmatic and practical. 

The Future of Air Warfare?

After World War I, military aviation proponents and prophets envisioned future wars as air-centric affairs, with fleets of bomber aircraft menacing an enemy nation. No longer would war be limited to those in uniform. With aviation technology growing by leaps and bounds during the 1920s and ’30s, new aircraft could carry more bombs across greater distances. These new warplanes threatened not only military personnel at, and behind the front lines, but now an entire nation’s civilian population was at risk. Strategically attacking a nation’s industrial capabilities, infrastructure, and military bases far behind normal battle lines became a sound and feasible strategy. In addition to causing physical damage, hitting cities and denying civilians the necessities of life also targeted an enemy nation’s morale. Toward this end, breaking their spirit was now a key objective of an aerial offensive. 

Such ideas were first codified by an Italian artillery officer named Guilio Douhet. In his influential 1921 book Command of the Air, he called for air forces to deliberately target civilian populations. Specifically, he wrote, “An aerial fleet capable of dumping hundreds of tons of bombs can be easily organized; therefore, the striking force and magnitude of the aerial offensive … are far more effective that those of any other offensive yet known.” 

 A German Luftwaffe Heinkel He 111 bomber flying over Wapping, London at the start of the Luftwaffe's evening raids of September 7, 1940. Australian War Memorial

In addition to striking military targets, Douhet advocated the targeting of civilians with incendiary, gas, and high-explosive bombs designed specifically to inflict a maximum number of casualties. For him, such widespread destruction would terrorize enemy populations and destroy national morale. Given such violence, Douhet expected civilian populations to capitulate quickly, forcing their governments to seek peace terms. Variations of his same thinking emerged from other airpower advocates, but such ideas were still only theories that “briefed well” and had not been fully tested. 

By the time World War II began, bombing attacks on civilian population centers had occurred in Spain, China, and Ethiopia. Such attacks created horrific scenes of carnage and even influenced Pablo Picasso’s classic 1937 painting Guernica. However, bombing civilians in these interwar conflicts yielded little military gain, achieving similar, yet ambiguous strategic results. However, after quick German victories in Poland and France, the Luftwaffe was flush with success and full of confidence. 

In preparation for a ground invasion of the British Isles, the Luftwaffe sought to destroy the RAF and set the conditions for the German “Sea Lion” amphibious assault. The Battle of Britain began in July 1940 with the Luftwaffe deliberately targeting RAF fighter bases and aircraft production facilities. Throughout these first weeks, Fighter Command met the German attacks while struggling to maintain an effective aerial defense. RAF Spitfire and Hurricane pilots attacked German fighter and bomber formations, putting up a dogged defense that slowly took a toll on both sides. However, RAF Fighter Command would soon receive a welcome respite. 

While the Germans avoided bombing London and focused on the RAF’s destruction, on the night of August 24, Heinkel bombers hit the Thameshaven Oil Terminal near the British capital’s East End. In retaliation, the next night RAF Bomber Command struck Tempelhof Airfield in Berlin and the nearby Siemens factory works. Four days later, British bombers struck Berlin again, hitting the Gorlitzer Railway Station. An incensed Hitler saw the attacks as an overt political action upon the German capital that required immediate retribution. 

The Blitz Begins

Days later, on September 7, Luftwaffe leadership ordered retaliatory strikes on London. While RAF Fighter Command was feeling the strain of the early Luftwaffe offensive, this change in German targeting was an important strategic blunder. No longer the Luftwaffe’s focus, the RAF had time to rebuild, rearm, and reconstitute Fighter Command while the German air force focused on civilian targets. By mid-September, the Germans changed bombing methodologies wholesale with cities and other urban centers. With this adjustment, British civilians now bore the brunt of the Luftwaffe’s bombs. 

During the Blitz, British civilians endured both day and night attacks that reflected prewar airpower theories. With German planes targeting British infrastructure, production centers, national will, and urban populations, nearly 7,000 British civilians were killed and over 10,000 wounded in September 1940 alone. The cities of London, Merseyside, Birmingham, Plymouth, Bristol, Coventry, Manchester, and Portsmouth suffered the most, but fortunately, none of these attacks included chemical or gas weapons. Many civilians fled urban areas for the countryside to avoid the German attacks; it was reported that finding a hotel room anywhere within 70 miles outside of London was impossible. Similarly, raids on Plymouth and Southampton forced thousands to initially leave their homes and live in tents or encampments located on the city outskirts.  

The targeting of British towns and industry certainly had a physical effect, but part of the German offensive plan was to destroy British will and the nation’s ability to resist. While towns such as Coventry experienced a drop in public morale, the Douhetian objective of bombing civilian populations to compel a surrender never fully materialized. Despite the Luftwaffe’s best efforts, the British public did not call for an end to the war. Instead, public sentiment went in the opposite direction. Although the Luftwaffe reported “signs of great [British] weariness” and that “optimism had disappeared,” by and large the British people continued their daily routines, and support for continuing the war remained strong. 

Initial Luftwaffe attacks on London targeted the city’s East End, an area that housed docks and accompanying warehouses. Hoping to disrupt the British economy and weaken national resolve, this industrial part of the city received as many as 25,000 bombs. However, bombing the East End had unintended consequences. Generally, poorer, working-class Londoners inhabited the East End and bore the brunt of these early attacks. Meanwhile, the upscale, more affluent West End parts of the city remained unscathed, causing resentment from their East End counterparts. However, that cleavage was quickly repaired on September 13  when Buckingham Palace and parts of the West End were targeted. One bomb destroyed the Palace’s chapel, illustrating the danger posed to all elements of the city. Queen Elizabeth The Queen Mother, who recognized the growing rift between the two ends of the city and their associated social classes, was quick to respond. Given the destruction brought upon the palace and the West End, she quipped that the Royal couple “could now look the East End in the eye.” The experience of German bombing united the city as the Blitz became a collective urban experience.  

Although many civilians left the cities and sought refuge in the countryside, most urban dwellers accepted a “new normal.” While the initial shock of the bombing caused concern with horrific attacks in other cities such as Coventry and Liverpool, these effects eventually subsided with subjects accepting their new reality. Throughout the late summer and early fall, people became conditioned to the wail of sirens as they sounded on a regular basis. Along with the urban raids, the Germans also switched to night attacks. A September 12 poll asked Londoners about their sleep patterns, with 31 percent reporting that they got no sleep at all, 32 percent reported less than four hours, and only 15 percent more than six. In addition to the amount of sleep, 42 percent of men and 19 percent of women spent their nights in bed while 39 percent of men and 46 percent of women slept on sofas or mattresses on the first floor. But as the Blitz progressed, populations became immune to the noise of the aerial threat and reported receiving more sleep on average as time passed. 

Morning after a night raid a cafe proprietor in a side street carries on. IWM (HU 105014)

Initially shaken by urban attacks, many people also stayed home or avoided work, resulting in some city functions grinding to a halt. However, as the initial shock subsided, and much like their sleep patterns, urban dwellers returned to their normal schedules. Despite the disruption of the German assault and attempt to affect national will, people still needed to pay bills, feed children, and support their families. As a result, the requirement to earn a paycheck was still a powerful incentive to venture out—and most did. Over time, people resumed their daily schedules despite ongoing German attacks. Douhet’s prophecies regarding mass hysteria resulting in national capitulation fell demonstrably flat. 

With sleep and work patterns affected for a short time, most civilians did not feel the need to take drastic protective measures. During the raids, only 9 percent of Londoners took refuge in the public shelters, with 27 percent seeking protection in private ones. For those who did seek shelter, they slowly realized that once a raid passed, most emerged to find very little to fret about. During one nighttime raid a young girl from London left the safety of her home and went outside to observe the attack:

“I wasn’t frightened anymore, it was amazing; maybe it’s because of out in the open, you feel more in control when you see what is happening…”

One Briton referred to the aerial onslaught as a “bore rather than a terror.” While London experienced 24 attacks in September and one every night in October, locals found that maintaining a normal daily routine was key to survival and a hedge against losing their morale. 

While many found little to worry about, the raids still had deadly consequences: most sources claim over 23,000 people killed during the Blitz, with an additional 30,000 wounded. As the main focus of German bombing, Londoners suffered the heaviest losses. Despite the damage and death, Britons developed a greater sense of purpose under the rain of bombs. They became more united and resolute. By November, a Gallup Poll showed that 80 percent of those surveyed were confident that Britian would win in the end. 

Such numbers did not support the ideas espoused by early airpower advocates. If anything, national sentiment during the Blitz actually proved the very opposite. While more intense bombing occurred over Germany and Japan by the Allies in 1944–45, neither of those populations reflected Douhet’s prophecies either. While those Axis populations were under totalitarian rule and had little choice, they too did not crack under an aerial offensive. In the end, the Blitz illustrated the resiliency of a population, the limits of airpower, and problems with an interwar theory that promised more than it delivered.