Mike Bell
Today marks the 80th anniversary of the Battle of Bulge, one of the most significant, deadliest events for the Americans in World War II. I'm doctor Mike Bell, executive director of the Jenny Craig Institute for the Study of War and Democracy at The National WWII Museum. Today, I'm interviewing doctor Rob Citino, the former executive director here at the Museum and a distinguished fellow, also an honored military historian and the author of 11 books.

So, Rob, thanks for joining us today.

Rob Citino
Mike, it's always great to be with you, even if digitally. I miss New Orleans on occasion. Rainy, cold day here in Cleveland.

Mike Bell
Well, you know, speaking of rainy, cold days, let's dive right into the Battle of the Bulge. You know, December 1944. You know, Rob, kind of help us kind of set the stage here, particularly from the German perspective of, you know. What.

What is Hitler hoping to achieve here? We can talk a bit about what you know, how this plays into the allies assumptions about how the war is going to go.

Rob Citino
Yeah. So I think probably to begin discussing the bulge, you have to go back to the D-Day landing. You know, Hitler had told anyone who would listen that our last chance of winning this war is to stop the allies and their landing in Western Europe.

And it happened on June 6. The Atlantic Wall got punctured in numerous places within the first 24 hours. There was tough fighting for weeks in Normandy, but eventually a massive Allied breakout. The German armies in Normandy were destroyed. The remnants of them, Hightailing it, we might say, back to Germany at top speed, one of the great pursuit marches of all time.

General Patton’s Third Army across northern France. And things looked great for the allies, and things couldn't have looked more dire for the Germans. But, you know, sometime right at the end of the summer or early September, it was clear that the allies were running out of gas. You know, I mean that figuratively, but I also mean it literally.

And that the Germans were getting that, you know, that classic second wind that so often happens in, in campaigns. Well, one side seemed to have it all their way and then their momentum [?] and the adversary kind of falls back on his supply bases and begins to reestablish himself. That had happened in September and October, right along the German border, so-called Siegfried Line.

You know, the allies still were feeling pretty good. They had some dreams, maybe, of ending this war by Christmas. The Germans, you know, are feeling pretty bad. They'd taken their lumps. And normally we should never underestimate the depths of that defeat. But somehow they'd managed to coalesce and at least their feet were under them again. It was Hitler, really?

But. But his staff as well, you know, reminding each other that, look, no one ever wins a war successfully defending in place. You're going to have to launch some kind of offensive blow against our adversaries. They had to. They had a western and eastern front. They decided to go with the West, thinking a victory there would splinter the Anglo-American alliance.

At the very least, the Western allies would have to fall back and give them breathing space to turn and deal in some indefinite way with the Soviet Union. So for many years of my career, I couldn't understand this. What did the Germans think they were doing by wasting their last reserves? Really, in this great offensive against largely the Americans.

But I don't know. I've come around. The more I think about it, they were going to have to do something. Surrender was out of the question because Hitler would not allow that. And frankly, no one in the army was arguing for it, either, at that point. But you don't win wars by sitting successfully on the defensive.

You lose them more slowly. I suppose. But the Germans are typically, as is the history of the Prussian German army, went for a big solution. They were going to launch one last great offensive. You know, Mike, I put it this way. If you don't think the Germans are going to launch one last great offensive, you haven't really been paying attention to the history, their military history over the last few centuries, really.

Now you can see it that way because I, on one level, we know how the battle turns out. We have 100-- We have 100 percent, you know, after the fact, ex post facto, everything looks explainable and obvious. I'm concerned that in our discussions about World War II, not the two of us, but generally people see more and more to be along the lines of, oh, this-- it all worked out...

Inevitably, None-- nothing was inevitable about World War II. Not one single occurrence, not one single day. Could you say, “inevitability... Took place.” Maybe after Hitler shot himself. Then things are inevitable that the Third Reich had lost the war. But I can't talk. I can't say I'm a Clausewitz-ian, that I follow the teachings of Clausewitz and that it's that, you know, war is the is the domain of fog and friction and unpredictability and then, you know, turn around and claim that World War II was inevitable, or that then indeed, German defeat in the Battle of the Bulge was inevitable.

Didn't look that way the first few days. No. And, you know, certainly it has its share of fog and friction. Briefly, though, let me kind of unpack even the Allied assumptions, because, as you mentioned, you know, many of the allies thought, hey, the war's going to be over by Christmas. You know, the Germans have had it.

The Intel assessments at every level said, you know, the Germans no longer have the capacity for anything other than local counter-attacks. Despite evidence to the contrary. You know, you see German forces build up Sixth Panzer Army, for instance. You know, the assumption is these would just be for local counterattacks. And so it's interesting how the German deception plan plays into the Allied preconceptions.

Every single intelligence officer is kind of echoing every other single intelligence officer. And there is a consensus that is coming across Eisenhower's desk that the Germans are through when it comes to major offensives. We now know today that there were some reports and there were some perceptive folks in the intelligence community. I'm not. I wouldn't be so quick to say that.

But do you want to be the one that brings that contrary report to Eisenhower's desk, when everybody else is certain that the Germans are kind of toast? I think, you know, I've never I've never been in a staff meeting, Mike. You know, I'll say that outright, but I know enough about human nature to know that when there's a consensus, standing up against the consensus, saying, you know, I think you might, everyone in this room might be wrong, and you're bringing bad news to the boss.

I know that can be very, very difficult. And I think it's an intelligence issue. I think it's also an issue of human nature. Hopes had been raised so high by the events at the end of the summer of 1944. It looked like the war was going to be over by Christmas. You know, that classic formulation. And now, you know, it's December and the weather's horrible and it's cold and you're shivering out in some trench or some foxhole somewhere on the front line along the Siegfried Line.

And, you know, morale is pretty low. And I think it's just very, very difficult to make it any lower by, by saying, you know what? I think we're really in trouble here. And as you know, that's one reason, I think, why no one said that. Even some of those who thought it might be true.

Mike Bell
Yeah. And and I think to add to that, you know, as, as the, the remnants of the German force, you know, fall into Germany and the re mobilizing, you know, these, these new Volksgrenadier divisions and, you know, assembling Panzer tanks, you no longer need, your ultra, your ultra communications that the allies had really bank so much on about German intentions. You know, they're no longer radioing their units. They're just calling them on the telephone or sending a runner. And so the absence of, of reporting in that case wasn't seen as a challenge, but just to confirm their perspectives. And so, you know, and to your point about, you know, many of these units are ground out, you know, the 28th Division, that's really going to be right along the road to Bastogne.

They're coming out of the Hurtgen forest, and they need 6,000 replacements. I mean, talk about some serious combat. The 4th Infantry Division, you know, major, you know, combat, you know, since Utah Beach and and, you know, the idea is we're going to put them in this quiet sector and, you know, bring in, you know, replacements. So not only are we not expecting a major German attack, but we certainly aren't expecting it in the Ardennes.

Rob Citino
Yeah. So there's two different kinds of surprise there, Mike. I guess strategic is the one. Are they going to attack or aren't they? Well, no one thinks they will and they do. And the other one is the more tactical side. It was like, well, where will they attack? Well, they certainly won't attack here. And of course they do.

I think a couple of phrases should probably be banned from the military lexicon. We're going to be home by Christmas. Any time your officers tell you that you should all run the other way. And the other one would be, this is a quiet sector of the front. Because modern war being what it is, a quiet sector of the front can erupt into fire at any moment.

And that is precisely what happened to some of those divisions in the Ardennes. Yes, it's an unlikely place that, because all militaries try to achieve surprise on their adversary. If they're not, they're really missing the boat. And it's just, there's a few. Someday you and I can sit down. We'll put together the list of things you should never say to your troops in war, but one of them, you know, “Don't worry, guys, this is a quiet sector of the front, Nothing is ever going to happen here,” might be one of them.

Mike Bell
Yeah. And then, you know, as the 106th Division comes into the line, you know, does a relation place with the 2nd Infantry Division, you know, so they, they hear some, you know, German vehicle movement and oh don't worry about that. You know, you're new you know, that's just normal.

And so...

Rob Citino
Those poor guys you mentioned 106th and they get a lot of you know they're targets of the opening invasion. They get hit pretty hard. But these guys had just arrived in the theater. They had just arrived in France a couple of weeks before as my understanding, and had been rushed up to the front. You know, we're just really kind of shaking themselves out into what you might consider a battle array.

And you're right. Someone said, well, what is that crazy noise we're hearing all night? It sounds like heavy, heavy equipment being moved, which of course it was artillery and tanks and that's exactly what you just said. People said, oh, you just got here. You'll get used to it. Everybody's spooked their first few days in the line.

And of course, those guys were, you know, they were hearing what they were hearing as everyone would soon find out.

Mike Bell
Well, and their conditions are pretty dire. You know, they're soaking wet as they move up through France. They come into line, 2nd Infantry Division, which is moving north for the Ruhr campaign. You know, they do a relief in place, but, you know, they take their stoves with them.

You know, the 106 isn't necessarily, you know, kitted out for winter, winter weather. And the 2nd Infantry Division didn't even, you know, bury their common wire. You know, it showed you very much. No one had expected anything in this, in this sector.

Rob Citino
That's fascinating. You know, it's amazing. We can talk all you want about high technology, talk all we want about tanks, modern artillery, and of course, air power reigned supreme in World War II.

But, if your troops are shivering and wet and unsure of themselves. All the technology in the world probably isn't going to help. And I think that, too. You know, these are very basic explanations. Alexander the Great would have understood that explanation. Julius Caesar, Napoleon, all the way up to the from the past to the present.

It's interesting to me. And again, as a historian of World War II, I tend to get tech happy. I tend to want to talk about tanks, but basic, basic care for infantrymen, an infantry column coming up, or, as you say, doing what is - always pretty, complex - So relief in place is not the easiest thing in the world to handle or to admin.

But boy, those those that admin, the level of admin you have often has all goes a long way toward determining the success you're going to have. Well, and, you know, two sides of this I think are fascinating. One is this incredibly optimistic and aggressive German timetable. But what the allies respond with is largely individual soldiers, small units, making do with what they have.

Mike Bell
So it's not about the most advanced technology or in most cases about the decisions of the senior leaders or the officers above them. It's really a pretty tenacious fight. So what do you know? Tell us, if you would, would you sketch out the German offensive itself? I know we leaped already into some of the American divisions, but kind of just set the stage for the audience.

Rob Citino
Yeah. So there's three German armies which are assembled in the Ardennes. The weight of the assault is going to be on two of them. You mentioned the 6th Panzer Army. Often going by the sobriquet the six SS Panzer Army, since they tend to be based around SS units, I often think that, you know, all the intelligence failures the allies had in World War II and this one in the bulge.

If only they could have stuck a GPS in Sepp Dietrich's pocket, because wherever he was is probably where Hitler was going to be trying something dramatic. And it'll be, it's been earlier than this. It's now in the bulge. It's going to be in Hungary. There's a second army that's going to bear the burden of the assault. And that's the 5th Panzer Army under one of the most aggressive German armored commanders of the war, von Manteuffel, great old Prussian family.

You know, I'm a historian of Prussia, and I'm constantly struck by the families that are leading German armies in both world wars. They are not Johnny come lately, and they were serving the Prussian kings a long time before they were serving the Kaiser or serving Adolf Hitler. So these roots run deep. And Manteuffel knows his way around a panzer assault, knows how to erase forces, knows how to hit with maximum impact.

And in fact, his army will be the one that hits with maximum impact in the course of the battle. So 6th Panzer and then, 6th SS Panzer in the north, 5th Panzer in the center. And then there's a kind of a defensive screening army in the South that's supposed to keep pace with the main assaults.

That's the 7th. And then sort of extend a defensive screen to protect the flank of the two attacking armies. You know, you throw in some commando units, you throw in some German troops who are trained in the idioms of American English to break through the lines and sort of sow confusion behind, behind the American lines and in the rear echelons.

You have a small parachute drop and the von der Heydte battalion, of which the Germans haven't done it really, since Crete. There's been some tiny ones, but they haven't really done a paradrop since Crete. It's about as much of a package as the Wehrmacht could assemble by this point in the war. This is an army that's taking its lumps, and it's continuing to take its lumps on the eastern front.

Of course, while all this is happening. So what really does, I don't want to say wastes itself, but it really empties the cupboard. It empties the cupboard. In order to launch this assault. One thing it really doesn't have. And if you just let me say this too, Mike, because he said what they do have, they don't have airpower. This attack is not going to, you know, lead off with thousands of German planes in the sky sowing terror in the American ranks.

And this is deliberate. Hitler has said he said it to more than a few people in the fall. We have to be like the Soviets. We have to do what they did in 41. We had airpower and they didn't. So they waited for bad weather. It's really amazing. The Germans, of course, used to be the supreme military force in Europe.

And are now admitting we're just going to have to, you know, roll over and play dead and do what the Soviets did and just kind of hang on during the good weather and wait for bad weather. Of course, bad weather doesn't mean they get an advantage in the air. Bad weather just means nobody flies. And so it's-- there is no real air cover over German units in the Battle of the Bulge.

But then again, the allies can't fly for the first week or so either. And so that's seen by the Germans in 1944 as an advantage. And I think it says something about the wasting away of their strength in the previous couple of years.

Mike Bell
Yeah. You know, related to that, you know, even, you know, they assemble about a thousand tanks for the elite echelons in this, which is an incredible number if you think, you know, relatively.

But but they're also, you know, the, the German Volksgrenadier divisions, you know, arguably are, are, you know, they're they're, you know, veteran officers and noncommissioned officers, but but largely, you know, folks scraped maybe from Luftwaffe or, anti-aircraft units or, you know, new conscripts, with a heavy reliance on, you know, automatic weapons, you know, rather than trained riflemen.

You know, I'd be interested in your thoughts about that.

Rob Citino
Yeah. The, the, the Volksgrenadier divisions have always been a fascinating phenomenon to me. And frankly, a lot of other people as well. The regular German army, you know, had been pretty much crushed in the Soviet Union. Think about Stalingrad. You know, you lose an entire field army kind of senselessly, 300,000 men, a little under at the time that the encirclement was first made.

And the battles have been bloody ever since. So. So what the Germans are doing in 44 is coming out the rear echelons. Now, that can mean administrative personnel supply meant men working in supply columns. You mentioned, you know, brand new conscripts. Maybe maybe get rid of millions of men who just are lounging around on the Luftwaffe as the Luftwaffe is now lacking planes, but certainly has a lot of men.

And so they're used as well. So the manpower is uneven. They're even lightly wounded men combed out of the hospital. But let us admit, lightly wounded could be a very plastic definition In fall and, early winter of 1944, you could be missing a limb. In fact, as some troops in the Volksgrenadier divisions were.

So you mentioned one thing. I think that a couple things that hold them together and one is, you know, veteran officers, there's no replacement for veteran officers and noncommissioned officers in, in getting even raw recruits up to snuff, you know, to give up accounting for themselves on the battlefield that veteran officers crucial. But secondly, these are troops who, you know, who are not experienced and they're going to need some help.

And there's a larger percentage of automatic weapons of machine pistols and machine guns in these Volksgrenadier divisions. So you don't know what to expect out of them. And that's something I'd like to address in the actual battle. But they may make a good accounting of themselves on the defense. They may melt away.

They may launch a local counterattack with real elan. And you'd swear they've been in the field for five years, or they might just sit there and do nothing. And I think we see the Volksgrenadier experience. They're the spearhead. But along with the tanks, you've got to have infantry accompanying the tanks. This is not, you know, this is not the 1st Infantry Division.

You might say that just, they all have high numbers and that's usually a sign in Germany that that's something, you know, that is amiss, but that they're, that they're lacking something. They're not really the front echelon troops, but they're going to have to keep pace with the tanks. And if they don't, then the entire assault is doomed. And, you know, without foreshadowing too much here, they give as good an accounting of themselves as you might expect, and that is to say, not quite good enough consistently across the field.

So there are some local, the 106th Division, US, is largely, you know, encircled by Volksgrenadier divisions. There are some-- there are tanks certainly in this assault and don't don't want to ignore that. But they give a pretty good accounting for themselves and that sector of the front in the opening days, 106th, the regiments of the 106th US Division were probably not deployed as carefully as they might be.

Of course, not expecting the assault they got, but I think in general you have Volksgrenadier divisions who give up, you know, just what about what you'd expect? And that is to say that, you know, they're not the elite troops of the German Army, the elite troops of the German Army are dead, probably in the Soviet Union, probably a year ago.

As a matter of fact, we have to, I know this is happening in the West, but if you're in the staff of German general staff, you know where the real action has been for the last couple of years. And of course, it's been on the Eastern front.

Mike Bell
Yeah. You certainly, you know, Montgomery's, you know, going to have, you know, concerns about the lack of infantry and American divisions, you know, as, as you try to continue this campaign.

And I think in many respects that's going to be one of the reasons why, not to reach too far ahead. You know, why the decision is just to push the bulge back rather than try to cut it off because of that shortage of infantry. And of course, the US Army's going to do a similar thing as you described, come the rear areas.

There's going to be an opportunity for African American soldiers to become fifth platoons, really, as a sign of the shortage of experienced, trained infantrymen. And, you know, the combat casualty rates, you know, for an infantry regiment by this stage of the war, 90 days in combat, an infantry regiment, you know, might average 100 percent casualties, killed, wounded or missing.

And, you know, the Hurtgen Forest-- couple weeks of combat. The division needs 6,000 replacements. You know, this is really the euphoria. The post-Normandy one side. Suddenly you're up against some serious losses and some serious experience.

Rob Citino
Those of us who have ever taught this material in undergraduate classes know that when you say there was over 100 percent casualty, some bright student raises and is usually and say, how can that be?

What does that mean? I've seen it and you say, well, look, you get 40 replacements and then they're all killed and you get 40 more, 400 more replacements and they're all killed. And soon, you know, you've drawn more replacements than your original complement of men, you know, Mike, you're onto something here. And that's something else I'd like to say about the bulge.

There's been a reductionist tendency to talk about the US Army's experience in World War II, both in Europe and the Pacific, and attribute its considerable success as just a massive waves of firepower and massive supply. So it's the great scene in the movie Battle of the Bulge, in which the Germans capture a US supply column, and every man and every forward deployed US soldier is getting his own Boston cream pie for Christmas.

And the German officer said something like, well, this is why we're losing the war. But, you know, there were plenty of times and there will always be plenty of times when your troops are left to their own devices. It's bad weather, you’re cut off from headquarters. It can be almost anything. And this is the US Army fighting not from its traditional strengths, which, let's face it, massive firepower.

No shame there. That's the army I want to be in. I want to be in the army with the massive firepower. I want to be in the army. That's well supplied. But it's not either one of those things in this particular battle, and especially those opening two weeks, I think of some it's not so much the army. I think of the Marines on Guadalcanal in the Pacific.

You know, they weren't fighting from prosperity. They weren't fighting out of abundance up on Guadalcanal, either. So there are plenty of times when US fighting men in World War II had to, you know, had to do it on their own. And chances are better than not that they got the job done. And to me, this is what I like about the bulge.

You're cut off, the weather's horrible. You're here. Supplies are running low. You've got no-- You know, you have no anti-tank weapons at the moment. And you're looking at a Panzer 4 or 5 rolling at you. And what to do. And you know, just enough US soldiers figured out what to do. A couple of tough defensive stands.

You got two big German armies. We always say three, but I've already explained one of them is a defensive screen, you got two big German armies hurtling at you, and they. What looks like all the armor in the world. You mentioned a thousand tanks. You know, in the Ardennes. That looks like every tank in the world.

If you see it coming at you on some narrow trail, you can dimly perceive it in the forest opposite the river you're on. That's a lot of tanks. And the Germans are coming at you. And just enough US troops, you know, made some very tough defensive stands. If I can get back to the German battle array, the 6th Panzer, for all you know-- People love the Waffen SS.

I hate to say that, but buffs of World War II are just obsessed with the Waffen SS. These elite troops, maybe some of them were elite. Some of them weren't so elite. They had a pretty horrible record of atrocity in combat. But we can talk about that. I hope we will as well. But they certainly didn't look very elite.

The Battle of the Bulge. They created one of the greatest traffic jams, going forward against the Elsenborn Ridge that anyone's ever seen. Matter of fact, they're probably still sorting it out there in the yard, trying to figure out who gets to get across this bridge first. And that has a lot to do with admin.

SS troops were taught to attack. Attack, attack. Well, let's first of all figure out exactly how we're all going to get going to deploy this considerable strength and make sure that it's not trapped on a back road 30 miles behind. So it was a fiasco, and it was almost a solid hub to hub line of US artillery.

And so they didn’t go anywhere with the screening force in the South, they made some progress. Fifth Panzer under Manteuffel made the most progress, you know, actually broke free for a time, you might say, broke through the crust of US defenders. Then they came-- you know, [?] and Bastogne. You need these towns.

There's not that many crossroads in the Ardennes. You have to have these towns and US troops understood that and hung tough at a couple of places and blunted, you know, as it's been said a thousand times, I can't take credit for this one. And I wouldn't. Blunting the blitzkrieg. In the Ardennes and and doing so in some of the toughest defensive fighting that that anyone experienced in World War II.

So thanks for letting me say that. I study the German army. People are enamored of its, you know, mechanized forces that much of the German army strength too, with some very, very tenacious infantry. And I think we can lose track of what World War II is all about. If all we do is talk about tanks.

Mike Bell
Yeah. No, I, I, you know, and you talking about the, you know, the 1st SS Panzer and [?] and you know, despite, you know, people's, attraction to them, they, you know, in addition to the admin route control and managing that, you know, they really don't conduct, much reconnaissance, you know, as they literally are running into American engineers and forces and looking, you know, so I said, you know, they don't do maintenance. The tanks, invariably are broken down. They don't do flank security, logistics, kind of resupply, all these what we would call these operating systems that collectively, you know, you know, the American army at least is attempting to bring all these together in that process.

And, you know, ultimately they're going to abandon all their tanks and break out on foot. You know, that doesn't sound like an armored spearhead. You know that--

Rob Citino
It's a good German word. The [speaking German], and it means like, you know, like, guy who's just hell bent for leather. He's going to do. He's going to drive forward as fast as possible.

And that's I would say that's very much the SS is self image. Reconnaissance. That's for weaklings. You know, supply will figure it out along the way. Administration, who needs administration? It just slows us down. That's how the allies fight. But I think World War II and frankly, the study of any war carefully will tell you that what happens at the cutting edge is, is huge, obviously, that no one's going to say it's not important.

But what happens at the cutting edge is often determined by what's happened in the rear echelons. But you know how good your intelligence is. I'll give you an example: Kampfgruppe Peiper, the 1st SS Panzer Division, Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler. It's the Adolf Hitler bodyguard division. You know, they're miles from the biggest Allied supply depot in Belgium.

At Stavelot. They could have. They could have fuel themselves. And to the English, you know, to the, to the channel coast, if they had managed to break through that fire with the gas and they were sitting just miles from. And it's so interesting to me that nobody had kind of spied that out. Nobody had really put an X on a map and say, “Hey, when you get the stop, you know, take your time because you're going to want to look at what's there.”

This, of course, gets us back to something I said earlier. The Germans are operating without air cover and they didn't really do a lot-- They couldn't do aerial reconnaissance because that would give away the surprise on which this entire campaign depended not going to not going to get to Antwerp if the Allies know you're coming in. So they hadn't really done the kind of I'm sure that a few reconnaissance like that said, boy, there's a lot of activity up, vehicular activity around this small Belgian town.

It indicates that there might be fuel there or something. I don't, but that never happened. And again, it's because the primary weakness of the German military array by 44-45 is that the allies don't just have air superiority, they have air supremacy. They can fly wherever they want and bomb whatever they want. And no matter what you do, how much surprise you achieve, you're going to have a hard time overcoming that.

But I think it has a lot to do with, there is no reconnaissance. Germans traditionally under recon. And in this case, they couldn't do any more than that because they lacked the aerial assets to do so.

Mike Bell
Yeah. And then I just think it's interesting for the commanders on the battlefield. Don't try to make up for that absence of tactical intelligence.

Rob Citino
It's funny, the Prussian tradition going back a long way is that, you know, the king would ride forward. I mean, men, when Frederick the Great rides forward on a personal reconnaissance. What he's telling every officer in his army is you better be doing this, too. If I can do it, you know, if I can take the time to do it, you better all know what's ahead of you.

And, But I think that had kind of been lost. And I do think the Waffen SS in particular, I think we can say this had distilled some good lessons from war. Let's, you know, get a move on, be moving forward at all times. No lateral moves here. Let's make sure we're, let's make sure we're throwing down the field.

If this were a football metaphor, that's important. But there's a lot of other lessons that the Waffen SS either didn't learn or completely rejected about this sort of cautious administration reconnaissance preparation you should do before you risk a single man in combat.

Mike Bell
Let me let me kind of set the stage for, you know, as they attack, you know, the 6th SS Panzer is fortunate, if you will.

You know, they attack through the little time gap kind of on the flank between two US corps on the edge of, you know, the 106 Division, they're really spread out in this sector. So, you know, you could it wouldn't even have what we might consider a doctrinal frontage, you know, and as you know, Rob, as you said, you know, the Volksgrenadier divisions will infiltrate and then, you know, surround two of the regiments, the 99th Division on the north bank is pushed north toward Elsenborn Ridge.

And, you know, frankly, then with the other American infantry up there, the first Division and others really cut off those routes. So very quickly, the German routes, you know, you take away about four of them, with that defense. And then, south of 106th is the 28th, you know, the Pennsylvania Guard Division coming out of the Hurtgen, you know, but they've got a regiment on the road to Bastogne.

Amazingly, you know, that regiment is going to have, like, over 2,700 casualties out of a regiment of, you know, 3,200 soldiers. I mean, it's effectively destroyed. And the challenge there, though, is that, you know, you add days to the German timetable. I think that, you know, the weather's bad, the trains terrible, all those things. But, you know, the tenacity of these units, even the 106th Division holding out, you know, those regiments held out longer than the German planners had assumed.

Then, you know, it's certainly not a foreordained, you know, peace there. I just thought that was pretty fascinating. And then real quick, let me get I think there's a couple big decisions that Eisenhower makes, you know, that influence the battle as we kind of see it unfold. And without these, it could be a very different outcome, you know, against your earlier point about, you know, with hindsight, you know, on the evening.

So the Germans attack on the 16th and plenty of confusion, you know, throughout the Allied ranks, what's going on? What are the reports? But that evening he's going to make his first decision. He takes the 7th Armored Division, which is up in Simpson's Ninth Army and dedicated South, and he takes the 10th Armored Division from Patton's Third Army and dedicated North.

Those two are really fundamental and both what's going to happen at Bastogne. And then at St. Vith, which, you know, without that extra armor. It's difficult to see how this campaign would have been as successful for the allies. And then the next day, Eisenhower, and largely by his intuition, because I believe Bradley's much more cautious and sees this as a much more local attack.

He's going to commit his last reserve, which, you know, for a commander to commit his last remaining reserve, the 18th Airborne Corps, with the 82nd, 101st, you know, the 101st race, you know, in route, it's going to kind of diverted into Bastogne, and the 82nd will go north, really to hold these two kind of key intersections and flanks.

And I think it's interesting, without those two decisions, you could have had a very different outcome. And I'd, you know, I'd, I'd welcome kind of your thoughts on that, Rob.

Rob Citino
So, you know, here at The National WWII Museum, we like Ike. We are fans of Dwight David Eisenhower and I certainly am. Look, you have to.

We've already-- I hope I've paid some tribute to the poor bloody infantry, you know, on the, out there in the field. But you also have to give a nod and a wink to Eisenhower. Everybody had told him this was impossible. And, you know, instead of flying into a rage and firing every single officer he had, which, let us be honest, some commanders in military history would have done exactly that.

Eisenhower takes a look around and he intuits something that a lot of people were telling him was wrong. Many people are saying, well, now the Germans-- All our Intel. Just no way this can be a major offensive. This is a local counterattack. They're trying to straighten out their line or, you know, pick off a weak Allied division or whatever it might be.

Eisenhower intuited some-- No, this is the deal. This is the real deal. Something has to be done almost alone amongst his fellow officers and the staff and all of that army of advisers he has around them, really all telling him one thing, and he said, no, I just feel this. I feel it in my bones. I suppose a commander has a kind of a sixth sense that the Germans call the Fingerspitzengefühl, which, you know, my students have loved over the years.

I mean that little tingly sensation you get in your fingertips when something exciting is happening. Something big is happening. And he rushes a couple of armored divisions forward. And then the next day, Mike right on the theater reserve, you know, the last uncommitted troops in his battle array. I mean, it's really quite something. 18th Airborne Corps, a couple of airborne divisions on 101st, of course, probably making themselves most immortal of all the fighters in the Battle of the Bulge, the stirring defense of Bastogne.

But we often say this about Eisenhower, Mike. And I know you've heard people say it. Well, not much of a tactical commander, not much of a battle guy. Mainly good for making sure that the British and American officers on him didn't kill. They didn't kill each other. Mainly getting between Patton and Montgomery. You know, that's how people see Eisenhower.

But this is one of those cases where I just beg to differ. And it's inexplicable, except to say that Eisenhower was a great commander and he did what great commanders are able to do, size things up with a single glance of his eye. Napoleon's, you know, coup d’oeil, as he said, the single glance of your eye, a blow of your eye.

You look at this battle situation and immediately you figure out what is happening and how you need to react to what is happening. And, you know, 100 percent kudos to Eisenhower because he flew against the advice of every intelligence officer on his staff, most of his colleagues. You said, Bradley, I think there were probably some others we could name, as well as saying, I don't think so.

I, I don't know, that seems risky, that they didn't think anything necessarily horrible was going to happen by rushing the 18th airborne. They just thought Eisenhower was going to [?] and he sort of overreacted. He got a little jumpy. He got, you know, he said he had happy feet in the pocket, to use another football metaphor.

Right. And that would have been embarrassing for him. And he was willing to risk that as well. You know, your reputation, your dignity, your gravitas is a huge coin of the realm if you're an army commander. He was willing to do that. And of course, like all great commanders, history proved Eisenhower right. So I just, you know, a word for that.

I do think that US Infantry, and, you know, individual tankers really showed their stuff in the Battle of the Bulge, but so too did the Supreme Commander. I think it's one of his greatest, certainly one of his greatest battlefield moments.

Mike Bell
Well, I agree with you. You know, a lot of his contribution is holding the alliance together at the political level.

And in this case, it's really, you know, what? It's the army. You know, the algebraic. You know, in the blink of an eye, he senses this has to be done. And the other one, I would add, you know, you had infantry and armor, the engineers, the seven engineer battalions in this that are committed early.

They're like the last thing that Middleton has, the engineers, you know, fighting his infantry in good engineer fashion. I think really, those those are some incredible, inspiring stories as you look at these engineer squads and teams and, you know, company strong points and, and, in many cases, you know, really, way above their weight class, you know, you know, the Germans had hope for, you know, 6:1 advantage in many of these attacks and in some cases martial even more than that against some of these small American units.

And, you know, I can, you can see their anger when, you know, when the Americans, you know, either surrender or finally withdraw off, that.

Rob Citino
The Germans had once inserted virtually every engineer, pioneer battalion they had in their entire array, and that was in Stalingrad, you know, to fight the last few hundred meters to the Volga. And they failed them.

They died in droves. It was quite the bloody battle. Just, you know, that's another area where the Germans, you know, they don't get a bridge down as quickly as they used to in the old days. They don't make crossings. They don't, they don't remove obstacles as quickly as they do. They've been outclassed and all those sort of other support functions, you know, they’re throwing every last man they can find, including some who had been lying in a hospital into the infantry.

And that's great. You know, you're going to, they're great. They give an accounting of themselves, there's no doubt. But it's those support functions that the Germans have completely failed, that they lost them in the fighting in the East, and they've never been able to replace them. And it's good because it's easy to look at a map and say, oh, two German armies and one has SS next to it.. That must really be something. And they were something. They gave. They gave an accounting for themselves. But they're also lacking in that support function, the things that don't really show up on a map. But I know professional officers study very, very deeply.

Mike Bell
Yeah. You know, and and you know, you're talking about the low level, you know, the infantry soldiers and others.

You know, one, I think testament to this campaign, the United States will have 32 Medal of Honor recipients, both from the Ardennes and the associated Alsace campaign. And if you think of that, you know, what an incredible, incredible number of, you know, individual actions that produced that.

Rob Citino
There's another number, of course, and it's 81,000.

And that's the number of total casualties taken by the US Army in the Battle of the Bulge. Right. You know, the biggest battle in the history of the US Army. And it's going to usher in a very, very bloody, very short year of 19, 1945. And it's almost a perfect curtain raiser on that horrible year. Mike, if I can pile on one thing you said there, and I would like to join you in it, you mentioned the big battles in Alsace. Operation Nordwind, for the Germans: Northern Wind.

It was supposed to be a companion piece to Operation Wacht am Rhein. This great offensive in the Ardennes. And together they would, you know, sweep the Americans out of, you know, out of their positions. And, again, hopefully smash the Western Alliance, the, the, the total of those twin defeats. But Nordwind was another one.

Our US troops were caught by surprise and with their French allies as well, free French fighting alongside. And the Germans managed to make some great progress. And just a handful of US forces taking some very tough defensive stands, managed to sort of break the momentum of the Germans, and they aren't really feeding from the rear. The Germans pretty much put everything they had into the front line.

They don't really have any reserves anymore. And American troops, again, in some heroic actions, managed to defeat Operation Nordwind. And it's funny, Battle of the Bulge. Everyone knows it. You know, my my, my grandmother of sainted memory and every-- and me and everyone in between knows the Battle of the Bulge. But a handful of people know anything about Operation Nordwind.

In a book I wrote in 2017, when I first got to the Museum, The Wehrmacht's Last Stand, I wrote about Operation Wacht am Rhein. I wrote about the bulge in detail from the German perspective, but also wrote a, you know, big, meaty chapter on Operation Nordwind and it's amazing. I've gotten a lot of commentary from veterans and veterans' families that, “My dad was in that, and he said nobody even knew about it or people didn't know about it and didn't give a damn.” But here's to the twin US victories in late 1944 and early 1945, in the Ardennes and all that.

Mike Bell
Yeah. I mean, if you think of that campaign in Northwind, you know, the United States is going to commit nearly 230,000 troops into that battle, plus the 610,000 in the Ardennes. You know, it's crazy.

Rob Citino
It's the last theater reserved. Plus, you know, every I mean, if the Germans were giving it everything they got, you have to say so were the Americans by this, by this point in the war, there's there's a reason Americans will be remembering these battles for I hope as long as there's the United States of America and not only the men who were badly wounded and who died, but just the the entire heroism of the effort, you know, at the beginning of World War II, there were a lot of people in the United States, even in the US Army, who said, American boys, they'll never make fighting men.

All they care about is going out on dates and playing with their cars. And, you know, you heard these tropes of American youth was soft and weak. George Patton, sort of, you know, that was his whole profane with that speech he gave that profane speech he'd give to the new recruits, you know, saying the F-word every two seconds and SOB this and SOB that.

It's trying to let them know, you know, they're not home with mommy anymore. But I'm never I was never sure that that was necessary. I think if the cause is explained to American troops, I think then and frankly, I think now explain to the American people, I think the Americans will, you know, will defend the colors. I've worked with young people, a year of my life is very dear to me.

[In the] 2009-2010 academic year, I was a visiting professor at West Point, and I met the young cadets. And people say, “Well, American youth are soft and don't want to defend the country anymore.” I beg to differ there too, because I, I certainly met some of the finest young people in my entire life during my years at West Point.

I think back a lot because that was, you know, a lot of them graduated and went off to various wars in various places that America has been fighting in the 21st century, and even some casualties there as well. So again, I just don't. I don't want to wave the flag too egregiously here, but I think this trope about, you know, Americans being soft, I never believed it wasn't true then.

It's not true now.

Mike Bell
Yeah. No. Well, certainly I think, you know, give an endorsement, you know, about the young West Pointers. Since my daughter’s now you know, a recent graduate in the 82nd Airborne Division. But--

Rob Citino
I set you up for that, Mike.

Mike Bell
You did, you did the, but but, you know, there's kind of two parts of that one was, you know, everybody, you know, Imperial Japan, Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, all go to war against the United States in December ’41, believing that trope you described, the Americans, you know, too much jazz.

They're corrupt. They're gangsters. They'll never amount to much. The potential is gone. And I think what as you see, this, it's very inspiring. It's know. Holy cow. In two and a half years, not only do you build an army, but you build an army that ultimately is effective in this major battle. I think the other one is that, you know, you remember the Why We Fight series, you know, that's what you do.

The War Department, you know, and but they they also did a survey of folks who hadn't seen it and 90 percent of those soldiers, over 90 percent, you know, could explain what would happen to freedom of religion, freedom of speech, if Nazi Germany won and so, you know, to your point that the American soldiers do know what they're fighting for and actually, have a degree of tenacity and resilience that was surprising to the enemies.

It does seem that, you know, some of the German units as they go into the Ardennes are expecting the American units to crumble immediately and and are genuinely shocked by, you know, what? The resistance they face, in that process. Now, that kind of leads me into, you know, we talked about, Kampfgruppe Peiper. And, you know, let's talk a bit about their atrocities.

You know, the 300 American POWs, not just the 80 some at Malmedy, but the others that they shoot in addition to the, you know, well over 100 Belgian civilians who are just, you know, murdered as well. How do you see that?

Rob Citino
You know, I, I've already said a few things about the Waffen SS, and, you know, I study the Eastern Front primarily in my own career.

And they're nothing if not consistent. Murdering of civilians is part and parcel of their ethos. They're they're outlaw types. They've got a knife in their teeth and, you know, a skull and crossbones on their cap. And that's very much how they see themselves, they’re bred - I don't mean this in the generic sense, I mean in the training sense - they're bred to be brutal.

They're bred to get as far, as far forward as possible, as rapidly as possible. And you know what that means for taking prisoners? Because somebody's got to care for prisoners and they've got to be herded back and blah, blah, blah. And it takes a lot of time. Of course, civilized people take prisoners and, you know, feed them and make sure they're out of harm's way.

And they do the things that the Geneva Convention tells us to do. But thousands of years before there was a Geneva Convention, human beings still cared for prisoners in combat. Waffen SS just, you know, took all the bad examples from the past and, sort of hoisted it on their flag. So even I mentioned the Eastern front, but even in the Western Front, soon after the Normandy landing at the Abbey Ardenne, it was the massacre of the Canadians there.

It's a place that anyone who visits Normandy should, should visit. A place where young SS troopers really, you know, besmirched the profession of arms. I, I would say for, for lack of a better term and of course, of doing the same thing in this campaign. And the excuses are always the same, that, you know what? We're told to get a move on and we can't, we can't dally around here and process these, these 80 Americans.

And so let's just let's take care of the problem in, you know, 2.5 minutes, which probably is how long it took to shoot 80 Americans at Malmedy and some of the others, that other atrocities that you've named. You know, I sure let's get a move on. I understand that, but I also think there's no explanation. It's just cruelty.

The Waffen SS prided itself on being able to do things that lesser men would shrink from, including, you know, murdering defenseless prisoners and murdering defenseless civilians. They're an interesting crew in that, you know, they covered their battle, the battle flags, all sorts of honors. You know, there's all kinds of things you could talk about in the Eastern Front with the Waffen SS seem to have saved the day.

And likewise, they fought very hard on the Western Front as well. No Germans would have gotten out of the Falaise pocket at all? If it hadn't been for some heroic actions by the Waffen SS. But, you know, at the same time you more than make up for that, you know, you more than get rid of that or help us forget that by the atrocities you've carried out.

And so I just say, you know what happened in the Ardennes? Why were there atrocities? And my answer is it's more of the same. You put Kampfgruppe Pieper anywhere. And if they're civilians nearby or takes prisoners, you know, similar things are going to happen. And Pieper wasn't the only one who's just kind of become the most famous or notorious one because it affected Americans.

Mike Bell
Yeah. No, I, you know, very much strikes me, you know, this is very much a Nazi ethos. You know, the Hitler expresses, you know, cruelty and presence, you know, and, and that there's a value of just being cruel, which on the battlefield actually, you know, can boomerang on you, you know, now, when your units, you know, our second quarter, you know.

Rob Citino
Yeah. So, you know, of course, you might say the Waffen SS does this because then it prevents any other Germans from surrendering for the rest of the war. And, you know, let's be honest, we're here amongst friends, that US troops shot their share of prisoners as well. Some of them, probably most after what happened at Malmedy he became known, but some before Malmedy.

You take a million men and you put weapons into their hands and you put them under military discipline. Most, most of them will follow the rules as they're explained. There will always be some renegades. And certainly the US military force has had their share as well. But nowhere in there-- never in US military history was cruelty enshrined.

This, I think, is a difference and something we need to carry. We need to bring out, nowhere was cruelty enshrined.

Mike Bell
And then even if we look at, like the Volksgrenadier divisions attacking, you know, the 28th, there are some incidents there where prisoners are shot. But typically, it seems that these are inexperienced troops that have been up in in close quarters combat with another group and, and the, you know, the immediate tensions and, and, anxieties are high and in, in a number of cases, the officers then immediately step in and stop more than a few people.

And so this is very different, though, than the 1st SS Panzer where this is, say, you're not in direct combat. You know, you've actually separated yourself. You can't say it's the heat of the moment. This is a calculated brutality rather than, you know, the challenge in combat as you're transitioning from close combat into someone surrenders and, you know, inexperienced troops.

You know.

Rob Citino
I always explain this to my students, because this is in World War I. And frankly, in every war that's ever been fought, you know, some lone machine gunner continues to pepper your lines with machine guns. And, you know, you see five of your buddies killed in the last 30 seconds then he suddenly throws up his hands, says, I'm a prisoner now.

I'm ready to surrender. And in, you know, in the heat of the moment, often that guy who tries to surrender is killed. I think we have to be honest about that. It's been every war that's ever been fought. But there's a world that separates that from the Waffen SS and the level above. And that's that's the level of atrocity of many Wehrmact units as well, but particularly the Waffen SS.

I try not to use the SS as the excuse for the nation. Well, I mean, everybody else was fine. It was just, SS troops gave us the-- because a lot of people did a lot of bad things cooperating with the Hitler regime in some way or taking part in it meant compromising your moral principles on some level.

And some folks took it further than others did. But there's, I don't you know, I never want to. I sometimes hear people try to give explanations for why-- Kampfgruppe Pieper killed the Americans at Malmedy and frankly, I leave the room. I just don't see any point in it. And I don't see any sense in it either.

I just think it's impossible to rationalize. And in the end, I think it completely boomerangs the, now, you know, to hit your point earlier about, you know, is it also a message to German soldiers? You know, you look at the number of Germans who are are killed, you know, because they're not, resolute enough in the final months of the war, but ultimately killed by, you know, the the party members, the Wehrmacht’s final retreat path from the, you know, across the Rhine into central Germany and then across the Oder into Germany, from west to east. The Wehrmacht’s final retreat path is littered with gallows poles, troops, the corpses of troops hanging from lampposts who have been shot or hanged, or sometimes both, by their own troops, or by roving squads of SS men. Look, trying to surrender as a German in the last year of the war is a delicate operation.

If you didn't do it quickly enough, the Americans would just, you know, vaporize your village with artillery fire. But especially calling in, they call in massive airstrikes. So if you didn't do it quickly enough, you fell foul of the Americans, who by late in the war, no one wants to be the last person killed in World War II.

American troops are just, you know, shoot first and ask questions later, which frankly, I think is pretty wise. But if you did it too early and then some of the Americans didn't quite launch the assault at the time, you thought they were going to launch an assault, and now there's an SS squad in your town. You and your family and everyone in your neighborhood is about to be shot in the head.

And it's an impossible situation. You know, Max Hastings, a great World War II historian. We've had him at the Museum many times. He wrote about the last year of World War II, and called it Armageddon. I try to beware of, you know, especially biblical, metaphors for what happened in World War II.

I'm not sure they're appropriate, but Armageddon, it just seemed, in many cases, as if all our civilizational restraints had been thrown off. And we're going a little, I guess, a field of the Battle of the Bulge right now. But it's where that discussion of Kampfgruppe Peiper and the Malmedy Massacre leads me. It's a bloodbath for the last five months in Europe, a bloodbath where everyone is concerned.

Mike Bell
Yeah. You know, typically we like to think, in many ways, that the Battle of the Bulge is kind of the, the, the, the high point of the violence. And then it just kind of peters out and, you know, the spring happens and the birds come out and the war's over, when in fact, the violence continues to escalate as the war continues until it ends.

Then, of course, not just violence, but the casualties. And so--

Rob Citino
You know, that's January, the bulge finally, I guess you could say we flatten the bulge by January, January, February, see some of the toughest fighting in the history of the US Army in the German Rhineland. It's that kind of gritty urban fighting that historians usually love, but for some reason are pretty much ignored here.

Then there's the Crossing the Rhine in March. First at Remagen and then this gigantic airdrop plunder varsity across the northern Rhine in March. And and then, you know, there's there's this on into the heart of Germany and even, you know, western Czechoslovakia, the Czech have it by the end of the war, the the Soviets break out of the Vistula bridgeheads in January, conquer the eastern provinces of Germany.

They've been German for 800 years, pretty much drive the civilian population out, get to the Oder and then launch, you know, the big drive into Berlin, one of the bloodiest battles in the history of mankind. So World War II, the casualties always blow my mind in 1945. It's a short war. But, but, but let's just talk about Europe for a month.

We could. We could extend this to Asia. About 30 percent of all German battle casualties. Military casualties happened from January 1 to April 30, 1945. Through four months, 30 percent of the casualties. You know, by definition, the Germans are in the war since ’39. So they that's 34 or 7 campaigning seasons. Right. And but 30 percent happening in that one period.

Likewise, the Soviets take about 20 percent of all their battle casualties in World War II, which are prodigious, as everyone knows, in the four months of 1945. So there's a I can now safely make a second reference to Clausewitz, who notes, you know, and he fought in the Napoleonic Wars virtually his entire life. And those wars just kept getting bigger and better, bigger and better.

The battles, you know, by the Battle of Leipzig, it was the biggest battle human beings had ever seen. And he posited that this is probably typical of big wars, of great wars, that they don't just kind of climax and then denouement and then peter out and they just keep roaring until one side is literally smashed. And he would not have been, I guess, surprised at all about how World War II ended with this, this gigantic plot.

Mike Bell
Yeah. Yeah, certainly. You know, the theoretical is that the wars are going to take that path towards total war. And, and I think, you know, that's an important kind of piece is, you know, if we look at American combat casualties in the bulge, not to mention, you know, frostbite and weather and sickness, it's about 10 percent of the combat casualties.

Just in that month, you know, so you still have, you know, a long way to go before it also, I think, underscores that there's this, this, sense about how does this war end, you know, we've been, you know, surprised here in the bulge and, you know, what is it that we have to do ultimately to finally destroy the German war making machine, liberate these oppressed peoples, set the conditions for the postwar.

Rob Citino
You know, it's interesting to me, Mike, about, we're talking about these last five months, but if I can just go back in time a bit, I think the way the war ends. Clausewitz was-- But of course, Clausewitz wasn't there. You know, both sides have a strategy. And, Roosevelt enunciated Allied strategy that after the Casablanca Conference would be unconditional surrender and Goebbels announces the German strategy right after the battle-- I mean, after the final demise of Sixth Army, February 1943. Totalen Krieg, he called it, total war. Well, never surrender. Fight to the end. Every last man, woman and child in Germany. So they said. And so you have an irresistible force. That's the allies, a gigantic military force.

And they're not going to stop. No negotiations, no quarter. And the Germans are saying, no surrender. We're going to fight to the last man. And so what you see in 1945, besides the immense human tragedy, is the fascinating theoretical interplay of two, diametrically opposed strategies. Given those two strategies, it's impossible to see how things could have gone any different, some less bloody resolution to a World War II.

If-- One last thing about those strategies, both enunciated at almost exactly the same moment, the end of the Casablanca Conference was January, and Goebbels gives his famous Total War speech at the Sportpalast in February. At the time, neither party thought they were really winning the war. The Germans had just senselessly sacrificed an entire field army at Stalingrad.

The allies were stuck in Tunisia a long way from Germany, and their merchant marine was being shredded by U-boats. It's as if from the depths of that, both sides decided to make an extreme statement about what they were fighting for in this war. Of course, the allies managed to prevail, but it's a horrible ending to the war.

Mike Bell
Well, and even, you know, you talk horrible, you know, Goebbels the, the mobilization of the Volksstrum, you know, all the teenage boys, you know, you know, the casualty rates among them.

Rob Citino
They got chewed up. I always say Hans and Opa in the same battalion, you know, I know there's a little boy and his grandfather in the same battalion had given rudimentary training, handed a Panzerfaust, one shot anti-tank weapon and sent out to go hunt T30 fours.

I mean, Hitler did a lot of immoral things in his life. Clearly, he's the architect of the Holocaust. We could stop there. But one of the many immoral things there was mobilize children and throw them into the line. They were chewed up. And frankly, we'll never know the casualties that the German Wehrmacht took. By the end of the war, the records were lost.

They're partial in many ways. Partial estimates. Some very good historians have devoted their lives to bringing some precision. And, you know, progress has been made. But I don't think we'll ever know how many kids died in the defense of Pomerania.

Mike Bell
Yeah, you know that as they're defending their towns, of course, they're not in uniform. So they’re shot as partisans or, you know, run over or even shot by the SS because they weren't stout enough.

Rob Citino
You know, you see photos at the end of the war and as American troops, you know, look well-fed, husky, or Soviet troops, likewise. And they've got, they've captured some, you know, Hitler Youth and almost invariably these boys are crying. Almost invariably, it strikes me how often I see that same photo. You know, they’d been unable to process what they've just been through emotionally.

How could they? They’re children.

Mike Bell
Well, and you know, we're talking about casualties. You know, you said, you know, the Americans have over 80,000 casualties in the bulge. I think the German numbers are, you know, somewhere between 80 and 103,000 are the numbers I see as well. So it's not like, you know, there's some incredible ratio of difference.

You know, in this case, it's really, incredibly, casualty-producing for both sides.

Rob Citino
I think, you know, Mike, you have this kind of very close range battle. You're in the forest in 1940, the German panzers just drove through the are down against negligible opposition. Handful of Belgian defenders this time to try to fight their way through.

And after a shaky beginning for the Americans, the Americans rushed enough reinforcements. There'd been a big battle in the Ardennes in World War One as well, and the big, gigantic close range battle multiple field armies on all sides. And it was a casualty producer. I think one thing about forest battle, these kinds of battles, an artillery round goes off in the forest, and who knows how many people that it kills as the splinters you know, get, get shot, hither and yonder.

So it's just a-- The dark, the dark Ardennes has taken its toll of many, many, many field armies heading, going all the way back to the Romans. Romans were terrified of the Ardennes. They thought, you know, it's kind of a ghost for us. You can hear the whispers of the past soldiers who died in the Ardennes.

And, you know, we don't really believe those sorts of things anymore. You know, we have a scientific view of reality. But in a way, the Romans were right.

Mike Bell
Yeah. You know, you're talking about the intuition and the field, you know. Do you have that feeling? Yeah. That's right. So Winston Churchill called the Battle of the Bulge, you know, quote, the greatest American battle of the war, unquote.

What do you think of that?

Rob Citino
Sure. I'll give Sir Winston that one. I think he's right on the money. A lot of great battles. If your loved one or your buddy died in another, you might say, well, why are we forgetting that one? I know there's a-- working at the Museum. People always want to say what was the biggest, how many numbers, what is the best?

What was the most decisive? But, but, but certainly the Americans answered a lot of questions at the Battle of the Bulge. Even a lot of perhaps put to rest a lot of self-doubts about whether they really rated as a top notch fighting force. And I don't think, frankly, I think by the time we get to the hour, then I think the question is silly.

I think they've proven it many times over. But nevertheless, those allegations still arise and certainly well after December, you know, after the end of 1944, no one could ever say the Americans can't fight modern war. You attack them at your own risk. You catch them flat footed. Maybe you get a few days of advantage once they get their feet under them, and then they call upon not only the immense tenacity of their infantry, but the immense levels of firepower on land and in the air.

You're toast. Or at the very least, you're in big trouble fighting the Americans. I think the Germans learn that and look at the American performance going forward, out of the bulge, across the Rhine into Germany. As I say, this is not easy. Fighting the Rhineland is one of the most densely populated regions on Earth. It's it's, it's built its combat in a built up area or whatever the current phrase is.

But it's, you know, it's combat in a built up area on steroids. It's one urban area after the other. The Americans, you know, get through it a con brio. They blast their way across a river. They drive, not only across Germany and seal off separate northern from southern Germany. They actually drive into Bohemia, that is, into the Czech regions of Czechoslovakia.

Prague, you know, it's really something.

Mike Bell
I you know, I think related to that, you know, you know, certainly their ability to the infantry, the armor, the artillery, the integration of tactical air, you know, all those come together, the ability of the logistics to keep pace with the speed of the attack, casualties, aid stations, all those are are pretty incredible as you as you think through those.

And, you know, that's an aspect that, in many ways, it shows how mature the American army had to come. You know, if you take its path from Kasserine, it had a lot to learn. But ultimately, the force in many ways is getting better despite the casualties, which is interesting. You know, the German units, you know, they're empty units are less effective than they were, say, in 1940 or 41.

I think arguably, the American units are, as, as a general rule, are increasingly much more effective than they were, you know, when they first enter combat in, in North Africa.

Rob Citino
I don't think there's any doubt. You know, I think Kasserine needs to be looked at pretty carefully over. Disastrous opening, and nobody can, I don't care how people explain it away.

The opening of Kasserine was disastrous to the Americans. They righted themselves and Rommel, even was pretty impressed by the end. But, you know, yeah, absolutely. The fighting qualities of the US, small units, in particular their ability to to combine arms, between infantry and artillery and to call in the air strike at just the right moment.

It's really, really quite impressive, with the armor support as well. But, you know, all the way up the chain of command, American corps commanders were a lot better in the campaign in Germany than they've been anywhere. One thing I think we have failed to mention yet, the encirclement of an entire German army group and the Ruhr under Field Marshal Modal.

That is a big attacking pincer in the north and a big attacking pincer in the south, linking up behind, taking 350,000 prisoners or something. Who knows exactly how many Germans were on the. We're in the Ruhr Pocket in 1945, but that kind of thing coordinated drives heading towards one another. You know, potential for blue on blue fire are all the reasons that American troops tend not to encircle their adversary.

They're really firepower-intensive units. And they take this very delicate operation. But they certainly did it in style in the Ruhr. And that, to me, is something else. You got Eisenhower, you got the men in the trenches. But those middle-level, those operational-level commanders, I think, really gave a good accounting for themselves in the German campaign.

And that's, I think, lessons that were also learned in the bulge. Yeah, I think that's a great insight. And you mentioned prisoners, you know, 23,000, Americans will become POWs in the bulge. But in contrast, you know, very quickly, you're taking hundreds of thousands of German prisoners, you know, and, and, the scale, you know, you think about, you know, the greatest battle of the war.

Sometimes we think of D-Day, you know, 170,000 Allied troops land in 24 hours. You know, fast forward to the bulge. It's over 600,000 in combat. You know, 20 infantry divisions, ten armored divisions, three airborne divisions. I mean, it pales, even the D-Day piece. How do you even sustain

those and keep them in the field and supplied and, medical support?

I mean, just that alone is an incredible feat. You know, if I may call, you said 20 some thousand prisoners, some, you know, probably the most famous one or young guy named Kurt Vonnegut, who would go on to become a very famous author and wrote the antiwar novel Slaughterhouse-Five. He, he was in he was taken as a prisoner to Dresden, kind of witnessed the firebombing of Dresden and then was one of those us was detailed to carry corpses out of buildings, which must have completely changed the course of his life.

And images that were with him till his last dying breath, I'm certain. But the Slaughterhouse-Five slaughterhouse once was a real place. It seems like you're reading a fantasy and of course, Billy Pilgrim is coming unstuck in time. And he's he's he's moving from place to place and time to time. It is a science fiction novel, but parts of it are all too real.

Mike Bell
Yeah. He was. He's one of the infantry soldiers in the 106th Division, in those two regiments on the [?] that are ultimately surrounded and will surrender.

Rob Citino
Right? Right. So this is, I remember, like millions of other people reading Slaughterhouse-Five and being particularly affected by it. And there's this said, what is the impact of the Battle of the Bulge?

And one of the soldiers that was taken prisoner in the later came home and wrote a great. And so these horrible things go, I came home, wrote a novel, Slaughterhouse-Five. And so you're still reading about the Battle of the Bulge, even if you don't know you are, when you read Slaughterhouse.

Mike Bell
Well, so it's a good point.

You know, 80 years on, you know, why does the Battle of the Bulge still matter? You know, you know, how do we reflect and learn from World War II? But, you know, there's aspects you mentioned, like Slaughterhouse-Five that so resonate, even if we don't necessarily understand the context.

Rob Citino
Yeah. Let me, I'll just say something and maybe with a bit of an eye towards current events, you know, in America and World War II, Americans from all over the country were thrown together into this gigantic military machine.

There were country boys and city boys. There's Catholics and Protestants and Jews and the Black and white and brown and every possible permutation of America. And those Americans in that military force learned to trust one another, knew they had each other's back no matter what was happening. And I, you know, I don't—I always get a little nervous about World War II.

The country was united and we were all together and, well, we're a fractious place. There were a lot of people who had disagreements on strategy, on wages and living conditions and World War II. And so let's just stipulate, we're a fractious people. But I think World War II is an inspiring example of what happens when Americans, you know, do pull together.

And, you know, we live in fractious, maybe even hyper fractious times today it seems, but when when I travel around the country and talk to many people, but the bottom at the bottom, we're all Americans, no matter where we came from, your citizen, you pay your taxes, you obey the laws. You're as good an American as anyone else.

And I think a lot of people learn that in World War II. A lot of people, you know, northern northerners and southerners just hadn't really been mixing much. They still had all kinds of ideas about one another from the Civil War. I'm certain. My dad, you know, was came from Italian immigrant Cleveland, Ohio. And then, you know, he had I remember him saying that the southern, you know, the southern sergeants in boot camp, you know, just wanted to murder.

But he said gradually he learned to realize that the kind of things they pounded into his head, his nonsoldierly head really helped keep him alive in the course of World War II. So that's, you know, those are lessons that we can all learn and we're all, all Americans and get out and talk to your fellow Americans, socialize with them, because millions of millions of soldiers had to do just that in World War II.

And they learned to do it, and it made the country a better place.

Mike Bell
Yeah. So it didn't matter if it was regular Army or National Guard Division by this stage of the war, all their replacements just come from America. And so yeah, that's right. You know, you might have started as they know Bedford, Virginia. You know...

Rob Citino
My dad was in the American division.

Mike Bell
There you go.

Rob Citino
In the South--

Mike Bell
23rd Infantry Division.

Rob Citino
And he mixed with a lot of people. That he met - a lot from a lot of places that he, you know, that he'd never met before in a lot of places he'd never been. And a lot of places maybe never would be. But I think Americans got a sense of what their country was, that it wasn't just your little local.

It's not just your town or your city or your neighborhood in a big city, but it was this gigantic sea to shining sea kind of thing that really could be a hope to mankind. Now, there are some inspiring words that American leaders have spoken over the years. We haven't always lived up to them, but I think by and large, in World War II we did live up to them.

One of the reasons I loved working at the Museum so much, I got to sort of talk about World War II to ordinary people who didn't often know that much about it might go, I think, if we're not to insult our audience, but I think it's true. They often would say, but I had no idea that was true.

And I always felt that we were really doing good work at the Museum and sort of reminding people of what had happened. Now, some 80 years ago.

Mike Bell
Yeah, I think the achievement, you know, one, the casualties are so incredibly huge that it's difficult to understand, but it's also difficult to understand even the achievement, you know, of putting together these forces, training them, deploying them, making them effective.

It, and then, frankly, the actions of everyday Americans, small unit leaders, you know, there's incredible inspiration in that where you see, you know, here's everyday people, not just, you know, thrust in to meet people they haven't met from different parts of the country, but they actually, you know, step up and, and, really achieve some things that are incredibly all inspiring for me as you go.

Wow. How is that possible? Let alone, you know, one, it's you're fighting, you know, not just the Nazi war machine, but you're also fighting the elements at the same time, you know, in the comfort of an office. It doesn't always you don't always think about, you know, the Siberian low and the, the temperatures that they're enduring as well.

You know, that that really would sap your strength and your tenacity to see what America and Americans can do, I think is really quite incredible. You know, for the Army, this is the largest single battle in their history, you know, so many units have links to this. You know, I think it's even, you know, today, as we think about, you know, transitioning our military or, you know, lessons there, there's lessons, you know, from what Americans did 80 years ago that I think, can can really serve as a, touchstone for us as well.

Rob Citino
Yeah. Mike, I think, you know, you're there's history, you know, what happened, but there's also heritage. You know why these things mean something to us today. And I think the Battle of the Bulge is a wash in a lot of both.

Mike Bell
Rob, you know, it's always great to engage with you and really benefit from your incredible insights.

Thank you for joining us today to talk about the bulge and and really to share, your wisdom.

Rob Citino
Mike, it's always great to be with you. Call me anytime you.