Top Photo: Original caption: “Signal Corps photo 5 June 1944 (Italy). Rome taken! Fifth Army armor rumbles past Rome’s ancient Coliseum [sic] in triumphal procession as Allied troops occupied the Italian capital. Crowds line the route to greet their entrance into the city.” From the Collections of The National WWII Museum, 2002.337.664

On June 4, 1944, the US Fifth Army under Lieutenant General Mark Clark entered Rome, making it the first Axis capital to fall to the Allies. While the campaign exacted a high price, the Allies would push German forces over 110 miles north of Rome by June 21 and reach the Arno River by July 23. Despite those achievements, the concurrent Normandy Campaign quickly overshadowed Allied actions in Italy and took priority for personnel and equipment.

On June 3, 1944, German Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, commanding Army Group C, declared Rome an open city. He ordered his forces to break contact and withdraw north of the city. Some German units, however, remained to contest Rome’s suburbs as American units advanced. After fighting through German defenses, during the night of June 4–5, elements of five American infantry divisions (the 3rd, 34th, 36th, 85th, and 88th), the 1st Armored Division, and the US–Canadian 1st Special Service Force (FSSF) advanced through Rome. The city was officially in the hands of the Fifth Army by June 5, and throngs of ecstatic Romans filled the streets to welcome columns of American soldiers. That day, major elements of the Fifth Army continued their advance through the city to engage German units along a 20-mile front on the Tiber River.

The Road to Rome

In early 1944, three Allied offensives in Italy, including the amphibious landing at Anzio in January, failed to break the German defensive lines south of Rome. The Fifth Army assessed “our drive in the winter had produced half successes. ... At Cassino and at Anzio our attack had been stopped. Our troops were exhausted and many units understrength.”1  

After those costly efforts, the commander of the Allied 15th Army Group, British General Sir Harold R. L. G. Alexander, began to rebuild and reorganize Allied forces from March to May in preparation for another push on Rome. On March 5, he shifted the “interarmy” boundary between the US Fifth Army and the British Eighth Army westward from the center of the Italian peninsula. Alexander’s offensive, Operation Diadem, had the goals of tying down German forces in Italy to support of the Allied landings in Normandy and capturing Rome. He issued verbal guidance for the campaign in early April, following it up with a written order on May 5.

From left, II Corps commander Major General Geoffrey Keyes, Fifth Army G-3 Brigadier General Donald Brann, Fifth Army commander Lieutenant General Mark Clark, and 1st Special Service Force commander Brigadier General Robert Frederick study a map on the outskirts of Rome on the morning of June 4, 1944. Courtesy of the US Army

Under Alexander’s plan, British Lieutenant General Sir Oliver Leese’s Eighth Army would advance along Highway 6 towards Valmontone, breaking the Gustav Line and subsequent German defenses south of Rome known to the Allies as the Hitler Line. Alexander sought to generate a three-to-one advantage for his infantry over staunch German defenders in the Gustav Line. In order to do so, he concentrated the bulk of the Eighth Army opposite the entrance to the Liri Valley to Cassino, massing eight divisions and three brigades along the 10-mile frontage for the main attack. Meanwhile, Alexander also focused the Fifth Army to a 13-mile-wide front along Italy’s west coast. Fifth Army would attack through the Aurunci Mountains and along the coastal road, Highway 7. After the penetration of the Hitler Line, Alexander would order VI Corps to attack out of the Anzio beach head to close the gap at Valmontone. 

Although Alexander intended for Clark’s Fifth Army to play a supporting role to the Eighth Army in the offensive campaign, the written orders Alexander provided his American subordinate with sufficient flexibility to assume a larger role for Fifth Army. The order issued by Alexander’s headquarters on May 5, 1944, specified the commander’s intent: 

To destroy the right wing of the German Tenth Army; to drive what remains of it and the German Fourteenth Army North of ROME; and to pursue the enemy to the RIMINI-PISA line inflicting massive losses on him in the process.2 

For the campaign, Alexander envisioned the US VI Corps breaking out of the Anzio beach head and cutting the main German line of supply and retreat, while Eighth Army advanced north. Alexander hoped to destroy German forces south of Rome, where he envisioned they would try to defend once forced out of their defensive positions on the Gustav and Hitler Lines. Clark’s Fifth Army would protect the British flank. Since Anzio, Clark clearly wanted to see American forces take Rome, and Alexander’s order did not specify how Rome would be seized. 

Meanwhile, despite the priority being given to OVERLORD, Clark’s Fifth Army had grown to over 350,000 soldiers. While the VI Corps was isolated in the Anzio beachhead, the reinforced US II Corps and the Corps Expéditionary Française—or French Expeditionary Corps (FEC)—prepared to assault the Gustav Line defenses along the coastal road and through the mountains, respectively. To their right flank, the Eighth Army, consisting of 265,000 men from 21 nations, had the British XIII Corps poised along the Rapido River and the 2nd Polish Corps oriented on Monte Cassino.

Against Allied ground forces were deployed two German field armies. With an estimated strength of nine divisions, Tenth Army defended the Gustav Line, and Fourteenth Army, with five more divisions, contained VI Corps in the Anzio beachhead. An additional eight German divisions were dispersed for coastal defenses and as Army Group C reserves.

As Alexander’s ground forces prepared for the offensive, the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces initiated Operation Strangle on March 11, aiming to cut German supply lines in Italy and weaken German logistics. In two months, Allied air forces conducted over 65,000 sorties against German road, rail, and shipping routes. While the Germans were able to repair most of the damage inflicted, the Allied air effort slowed German resupply efforts in the coming campaign on the ground.

At about 4:00 p.m. on May 11, Allied commanders read messages from Alexander and Clark. Alexander put the offensive in the context of the overarching Allied strategy that was in motion against the Nazis. He noted that the Allies were “now assembling for the final battles on sea, on land, and in the air” to defeat Germany. “From the East and the West, from the North and the South, blows are about to fall which will result in the final destruction of the Nazis and bring freedom once again to Europe, and hasten peace for us all. To us in Italy has been given the honour,” Alexander observed, “to strike the first blow.”3 

Striking the First Blow

The offensive began six hours later and quickly dislodged German defenders. Alexander’s plan called for a simultaneous attack on the Gustav Line to prevent the enemy from effectively employing reserves. That first night, artillery fires from seven divisions and 28 separate battalions supported the attacks of the FEC and II Corps. Naval gunfire and Allied air power provided additional support and helped to isolate the battlefield. The attack of the FEC penetrated the Gustav Line within 24 hours. Before dawn on May 14, the German units in front of II Corps withdrew. By May 15, the Gustav Line west of Cassino had been broken by the Fifth Army’s II Corps and FEC and by Eighth Army’s XIII Corps, followed by the I Canadian Corps. 

Testifying to the effectiveness of this new Allied offensive, Kesselring reported on May 19 that for the first time, the Allies conducted well-coordinated, simultaneous attacks along the front. The Allied units were using methodical tactics, strong concentrations of tanks when the terrain permitted, and short barrages of artillery fires “of unprecedented intensity.” He observed that the Allied attacks had bypassed German strongpoints whenever possible and penetrated mountainous terrain, “which previously had been considered impassable.”4 

The British drive in the east stalled in the Liri Valley, and their advance did not resume until May 18–19 after the 2nd Polish Corps took Cassino. Meanwhile, German forces in the Liri Valley were able to dig in, requiring the Eighth Army into costly frontal assaults. During this period, the situation facing Fifth Army remained fluid. In response, Clark issued orders for the Fifth Army to continue the attack and link up with his forces from Anzio. On May 23, Major General Lucien K. Truscott Jr.’s VI Corps attacked aggressively from the Anzio beachhead and, after three days of hard fighting, broke free, threatening to drive a wedge between the Tenth and Fourteen Armies. In the meantime, on May 25, a reconnaissance patrol from VI Corps made contact with a task force of the 88th Infantry Division from II Corps. 

Anzio-Cassino Area, 1944. Department of History, United States Military Academy, West Point, NY

The German command considered that the linkup and breakout would have a decisive impact, and they began rapidly withdrawing units to the Caesar Line, an incomplete line of fortifications south of Rome. The defensive line ran from the coast about 15 miles north of Anzio, east through Velletri, and then extended to a point two miles south of Valmontone. In addition, Army Group C committed its last mobile reserve, the Fallschirm-Panzer-Division 1. “Hermann Göring”—the Hermann Göring Paratroop Panzer Division—to shore up the fight south of Rome. 

The Drive on Rome

Clark also adjusted his plan, Operation Buffalo, to the new situation. His intelligence reports relayed that the enemy was concentrating around Valmontone, and, in so doing, the area north of Anzio was being denuded of troops. Over the protest of Truscott and apparently without consulting his staff or Alexander, Clark decided to shift his main effort to Rome.  Late on May 25, he issued verbal orders, which were followed in writing the next day. On the morning of May 26, the bulk of VI Corps would shift north for a drive on Rome, breaking the southwest anchor of the last German defensive line before the city. Clark assessed: “The overwhelming success of the current battle makes it possible to continue Operation Buffalo with powerful forces and launch a new attack along the most direct route to Rome.”5 The 3rd Infantry Division, supported by the 1st Special Service Force and an element of the 1st Armored Division to protect its flanks, would continue its attack toward Valmontone and cut Highway 6.6   

At the time, Alexander accepted Clark’s decision, but it has remained a source of controversy. The Allies did not destroy the German armies south of Rome. Historians have maintained that Clark, driven by his ego, allowed a major portion of the German army to escape.7 Clark’s adversaries, however, had greater respect for the controversial decision. During a postwar debriefing, Kesselring and other senior German leaders observed, “The adaptability of the Allied Command to arising situations could for the first time be observed when the American Fifth Army was fighting its big battle. Favorable situations were exploited during combat, while previously the Command used to stick to the plans set in advance.”8 

Initially, Fifth Army’s attack north met stiff German resistance, and the 45th and 34th Infantry Divisions made slow progress against the Ceasar Line. The possibility of a renewed stalemate south of Rome loomed. To the southeast, the FEC continued to attack successfully, the 3rd Infantry Division reached positions to range Highway 6 with artillery fire, and the 36th Infantry Division was committed to cover the gap between the 3rd Infantry Division and the elements of VI Corps moving northward. 

On the night of May 27–28, patrols of the 36th Infantry Division found a gap in the German lines between the Herman Goering Panzer Division and the 362nd Infantry Division. The gap was on top of Mount Artemisio, and the 36th Infantry Division launched its three regiments to secure the heights, from which American artillery brought Highway 6 under fire. Truscott quickly exploited the situation. American artillery dominated the German positions and their major supply route. German counterattacks to restore the line failed, and the German positions at Valmontone became untenable due to artillery fires. General Eberhard von Mackensen was relieved of command of Fourteenth Army. On June 2, the 3rd Infantry Division seized Valmontone. German leaders concluded that “especially during the battles for Valmontone Pass the Allied Command rapidly found and attacked the weak places of the German defense.”9

As Clark’s VI and II Corps, the FEC, and the Eighth Army continued the attack, Kesselring ordered his units to withdraw north on June 2. Remaining elements of the German Tenth and Fourteenth Armies retreated through Rome, behind covering forces in Rome’s suburbs. On June 3, Kesselring declared Rome an open city. On June 4, Allied leaflets dropped on the city alerted the Roman people, urging them “to protect the city from destruction” as the Allies attack “to destroy the enemy.”10 

U.S. General Mark W. Clark riding in jeep on the Via della Conciliazione (Road of the Conciliation); dome of St. Peter's Basilica in background. Personal Caption: "General Mark Clark in Rome." Rome, Italy. 1945. Gift from Dylan Utley. 2012.019.760

Clark’s attack on Rome was an impressive feat of arms by a force of over 300,000 soldiers attacking in multiple directions. Attacking northwest along Highway 7, the Via Appia Nuova, were Truscott’s 1st Armored Division and the 34th Infantry Division. The 36th Infantry Division attacked east over the Alban Hills on the corps right. On Truscott’s left, along the coast, the British 1st and 5th Infantry Divisions advanced to the north. 

To the right of Truscott’s VI Corps was II Corps under the command of Major General Geoffrey T. Keyes, with the 88th Infantry Division oriented along the axis of Highway 6, the Via Casilina, leading northwest to Rome. On his left, Keyes had the 85th Infantry Division; on his right, the 3rd Infantry Division and the 1st Special Service Force. The divisions in the FEC attacked on the right of II Corps. 

On June 4, mobile Allied assault forces entered the outskirts of Rome from the southeast and continued to advance, despite what some units reported to be considerable resistance; Brigadier General Robert Frederick, commanding the FSSF, was wounded three times. By dusk, units reached the center of the city, and Rome was in the hands of the Allies. The next morning, thousands cheered the American soldiers as they moved through the ancient city.

Aftermath and Legacy

In the pursuit that followed, by June 21, the German armies had been pushed 110 miles north of Rome. Fifth Army reached the banks of the Arno River on July 23. Eighth Army seized Florence on August 5. In late July and early August, Alexander, Clark, and Leese called a halt to Allied offensive operations.11  German forces established defensive positions north of Florence along what became the Gothic Line.

From the beginning of April 1944 through Operation Diadem, the offensive to liberate Rome had been costly. In the tough fighting, Fifth Army lost 265 Sherman tanks and 91 light tanks, armored cars, and halftracks. The Fifth Army reported that it had sustained a total of 21,024 American casualties, with 3,667 killed, 16,153 wounded, and 1,204 missing. Also in Fifth Army ranks, French and British units sustained 10,635 and 3,355 casualties, respectively. Total Allied casualties in the US Fifth Army and the British Eighth Army were over 43,000. In contrast, German losses were estimated to be 38,000 killed and wounded. An additional 15,606 German soldiers were taken prisoner by the Fifth Army.12  

While the liberation of Rome grabbed headlines around the world, the accomplishment was quickly overshadowed by the Normandy landings on June 6. The campaign in Normandy and the subsequent Allied landings in southern France reduced the priority given to the Italian theater, resulting in the redeployment of the VI Corps headquarters and the 3rd, 36th, and 45th Infantry Divisions to the newly constituted Seventh Army, destined to land in southern France in August. With the shift in priority, the forces remaining in Italy would receive less and less in terms of men and equipment. By fall 1944, the Fifth and Eighth Armies boasted a total of 14 combat divisions; facing them in Italy’s difficult terrain were elements of some 26 German divisions, which were estimated to equal about 16 or 17 divisions. After the campaign around Rome, Kesselring’s forces staged a fighting withdrawal north to the Arno River, establishing new defenses known as the Gothic Line. 

Following the liberation of Rome, and the shift of the Allied priority in the European theater on D-Day and campaigns northwest Europe, the Italian Campaign would grind on for another 11 months. Only in May 1945, after the fall of Berlin, did German forces surrender unconditionally. Meanwhile, the Pacific Theater was also competing for resources, and on June 5, 1944, a major American assault force departed Hawaii for Saipan in the Marianas. From Saipan, American strategic bombers could target another Axis capital: Tokyo.

• 1

  Headquarters, Fifth Army, Fifth Army History, Part V, The Drive to Rome, Milan [1944], Ike Skelton Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, p. 117. https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll8/id/1528/rec/17

• 2

  Headquarters, Fifth Army, Fifth Army History, Part V, The Drive to Rome, Annex 1, Milan [1944], Ike Skelton Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, p. 172. https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll8/id/1528/rec/17

• 3

  H. R. Alexander, “Order of the Day: Soldiers of the Allied Armies in Italy,” Headquarters, Fifth Army, Fifth Army History, Part V, The Drive to Rome, Annex 2, Milan [1944], Ike Skelton Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, p. 199. https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll8/id/1528/rec/17

• 4

  Kesselring, “First Evaluation by the Commander-in-Chief Southwest (Army Group C) of Enemy Tactics During the Offensive Since 12 May 1944,” Headquarters, Fifth Army, Fifth Army History, Part V, The Drive to Rome, Annex 2, Milan [1944], Ike Skelton Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, pp. 192. https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll8/id/1528/rec/17

• 5

  Clayton D. Laurie, Rome-Arno: 22 January-9 September 1944 (Center of Military History, 2019), pp. 24-26. 

• 6

  Headquarters, Fifth Army, “Operations Instruction Number 24, 26 May 1944” Fifth Army History, Part V, The Drive to Rome, Annex 1, Milan [1944], Ike Skelton Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, p. 199. https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll8/id/1528/rec/17

• 7

  Clayton D. Laurie, Rome-Arno: 22 January-9 September 1944 (Center of Military History, 2019), p. 26.

• 8

  U.S. Army Europe Historical Division, German Version of the History of the Italian Campaign (ca. 1949), Ike Skelton Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, p. 155

• 9

  U.S. Army Europe Historical Division, German Version of the History of the Italian Campaign (ca. 1949), Ike Skelton Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, p. 155

• 10

  Clayton D. Laurie, Rome-Arno: 22 January-9 September 1944 (Center of Military History, 2019), pp. 7, 26-27. 

• 11

  Clayton D. Laurie, Rome-Arno: 22 January-9 September 1944 (Center of Military History, 2019), p. 31. 

• 12

  Headquarters, Fifth Army, Fifth Army History, Part V, The Drive to Rome, Annex 1, Milan (ca. 1945), Ike Skelton Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, pp. 211-215. https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll8/id/1528/rec/17