Top Photo: A Lend-Lease M4A2 (76) W Sherman in Soviet service in the 64th Guards Tank Regiment, 8th Guards Mechanized Corps. US Army Signal Corps

There is little doubt that the Soviet Union took on the lion’s share of fighting the German Wehrmacht during World War II. It is estimated that the Red Army inflicted about 70 percent of the battle deaths the Wehrmacht suffered. Losing some 25 million people in the four-year slog, the USSR and the Red Army conducted combat operations on an unprecedented scale over an area roughly half the size of the United States. Every Soviet citizen was drawn into the conflict as large segments of the communist country were overrun and occupied by German forces. In defending “Mother Russia,” this catastrophic event still reverberates in areas comprising the former Soviet Union and is remembered as the “The Great Patriotic War.” 

Fighting on the Eastern Front was of an unimaginable scale with the Soviet victory coming from a great sacrifice on the part of its civilians and the sheer weight of the Red Army. Missing from those accounts typically is any acknowledgment of an American role in the Soviet achievement.

After blunting the initial German offensive in 1941, Operation Barbarossa, and the subsequent entry of the United States into the conflict, the Soviet Union became part of the Allied powers. Joining with the United States and the United Kingdom, the USSR benefited significantly from its alliance with its Western allies. However, after V-E Day and continuing into the Cold War, many Soviet historians downplayed the importance of the Western powers’ contribution in the conflict. 

Absent in much of the Soviet history books were the military offensives in the Mediterranean, Western Europe, and over the skies of occupied territories. Similarly dismissed were the large quantities of material aid from America’s “arsenal of democracy” that helped keep the Soviets in the fight. Starting as early as October 1941 until July 1945, millions of tons of foodstuffs, raw materials, and equipment made/produced in the United States was sent to the USSR. While the Red Army certainly did help “strip the gears” of the German war machine in combat, American “Lend-Lease” support sent to the USSR not only tipped the scales in Eastern Europe but enabled the victory on the Russian Front.

Foundations of Lend Lease

When the war in Europe began, many Americans looked to avoid direct national intervention. Seemingly protected by two great oceans, national policies reflected isolationist objectives keeping the United States out of any overseas conflict. While President Franklin D. Roosevelt hoped to provide aid to countries countering Axis aggression, he complained that the existing Neutrality Acts prevented American material support to friendly nations. However, American sentiment began to change after the German invasion of Poland in September 1939. Subsequently, on November 4, 1939, Congress ended the embargo of military equipment, establishing a new policy called “Cash and Carry.” This allowed for the sale of military hardware and equipment to friendly nations.

After the fall of France in 1940, the United Kingdom, fighting alone in Western Europe, was running out of cash to purchase American equipment. As a result, FDR took the existing policy of “Cash and Carry” a step further with the introduction of the “Lend-Lease Act” on December 17, 1940. This new policy removed the initial “Cash and Carry” requirement and deferred payment. In advocating this new policy, Roosevelt explained that if your neighbor’s house is on fire, you don’t open negotiations to sell him your hosepipe; you lend it to him, and he returns it afterwards and pays for any damage done to it. With this sentiment, the act passed on March 11, 1941, and was continued annually until July 1945.

Signing of the Lend-Lease agreement in 1941. Present in this photo is Soviet Comisar V. M. Molotov, US Diplomat W. Averell Harriman, and the UK’s Lord Beaverbrook. (US Navy Heritage and History Command Photo)

Originally intended to support Britain, the act eventually expanded to other countries facing aggression. After the Germans initiated Operation Barbarossa in June 1941, the act was then applied to the Soviet Union, though initially on a paying basis. However, stipulations applying to the Soviet Union were different from other countries receiving Lend-Lease aid. Initially, the Red Army could receive up to $1 billion dollars' worth of goods and equipment without having to pay interest. Furthermore, the Soviet state would not have to begin repayment until five years after the end of the war. When the United States finally entered the war, Lend-Lease support continued, with Roosevelt emphasizing that weapons and supplies from America’s arsenal of democracy were crucial to the efforts of Great Britain, the Soviet Union, China, and other Allied nations.

Lend Lease to the Soviet Union

Assisting the Soviet war effort American Lend-Lease eventually transferred over $11 billion dollars of goods to Soviet Russia—roughly the equivalent of $250 billion today. Those shipments included 400,000 vehicles, 14,000 aircraft, 13,000 tanks, 8,000 tractors, 4.5 million tons of food, and 2.7 million tons of petroleum products, as well as millions of blankets, uniforms, and boots, and 107,000 tons of cotton. While a significant effort on the part of the United States, official Soviet history claims that only 12 percent of airplanes, 10 percent of tanks, and 2 percent of artillery pieces from Lend-Lease were used in the fight. Downplaying the American contributions, Nikolai Voznesky, chairman of Soviet State Planning Committee (Gosplan), reported that Lend-Lease amounted to only 4 percent of Red Army material production. This statement was readily repeated by Soviet apparatchiks during the Cold War despite an unclear definition of just what “material production” they were actually referring to.

British and American Lend-Lease supplies transferred to the Soviet Union during World War II. An American M3 "Stuart" Tank being loaded onto a railroad car en-route to Russia in the Middle East. Photographed by Nick Parrino, March 1943. Office of War Information Photograph, 28357-E. (2016/02/19).

Countering Voznesky’s assessment, his statistics appear to reflect only deliveries made in 1941–43, when Lend-Lease was initiated. Apparently, his numbers did not include 1944–45 delivery figures, which were much more substantial. When considering how much Lend-Lease support was delivered and what percentage it reflected overall Soviet production, exact numbers are problematic. Given the paranoid nature of the Soviet government and its officials, trustworthy or verified production figures during the Stalin era are hard to acquire. Any numbers related to this topic have questionable fidelity or accuracy, and after the emergence of the Cold War, the 4 percent figure probably reflects the political environment following VE Day with Soviet leadership was loath to give any significant credit to the Western powers. However, even if the 4 percent figure has some basis in fact, Lend-Lease provided critical supplies and equipment at times when the USSR was at a tipping point. Such supplies not only enabled ailing Soviet industrial and agricultural efforts, but, more importantly, arrived at crucial times in the war.

During the early months of the German invasion, the Red Army conducted a strategic withdrawal and defended Moscow without assistance from the West. While winter weather and other factors helped stall the Wehrmacht in December 1941, the Red Army conducted these defensive operations with its own organic forces and equipment. While executing its withdrawal, the USSR also displaced much of its industrial capacity safely east of the Urals. Having to rebuild itself in new locations, Soviet production numbers dropped appreciably during this period. Lend-Lease helped fill the gap between the time factories moved east and the production of new equipment once the industrial base was reestablished. Even if American equipment was only 4 percent of the Soviet industrial capacity, this stop-gap support came at a crucial time in the war. While the USSR did not receive significant support from Lend-Lease until 1943, shipments in 1942 were both welcomed and timely. In 1943, Soviet Premier Josef Stalin considered the American Lend-Lease aid already received to have been decisive.

Lend-lease shipments from the United States to the U.S.S.R. from 1941-45. Department of State

In March 1942, as American production capacity was ramping up, the Soviets were still reeling from the initial German offensive. Concerned the Soviets might still capitulate, Roosevelt made the USSR the top priority for Lend-Lease deliveries. Ultimately, aid to the Soviet Union constituted about 23 percent of the total Lend-Lease program. To facilitate a quicker response to Soviet requests, the president removed the requirement for the Communist state to justify its equipment or raw material requests. Additionally, these requests were honored with no quid pro quo required on the Soviet part. However, such accounting was still required by other nations receiving American Lend-Lease support. Underscoring the Soviet priority set by FDR, deliveries of equipment often competed with American concerns. Some argued that aid to the USSR undercut support for American armed forces and its ability to equip its own military.  

The Materials for War

Much of the Lend-Lease materials sent to the USSR came in the form of raw materials (aluminum, copper, manganese, and coal) as well as industrial equipment. As a result, these materials along with specialized tools sets and machinery enabled Soviet industry to build required equipment faster. Instead of just sending the Red Army completed end items from the United States, Lend-Lease allowed the USSR to increase its domestic production of armaments and associated machinery. American aluminum alone accounted for 42 percent of Soviet supplies of the metal. Helping Soviet refinery operations, Lend-Lease also provided aviation fuel that equaled over 50 percent of what the USSR produced during the war. In addition, the United States shipped to the Soviet Union a Ford tire factory so they could produce tires for military vehicles. As a result, the timely delivery of both materials and machines allowed the newly displaced Soviet industry to recover quicker than it might have without such support, with Lend-Lease a major factor in providing productive capacity. Such support would not be included in Voznesky’s dubious 4 percent figure. Furthermore, these same shipments included equipment that was also used to rebuild the Soviet Union after the conflict ended.

Certain Lend-Lease equipment sets relieved bottlenecks or filled significant gaps within the Soviet production base, allowing factories to focus on other wartime requirements. Transportation exemplified one of these bottle necks or gaps. American transportation assets became readily available to move newly built equipment to the front. Given the vastness of the Soviet Union, movement of equipment and supplies from the factory to the foxhole was a significant logistical hurdle. With this support, Ural-based industries did not have to build as many trucks, rail cars, or locomotives. Addressing this need, Americans provided almost 2,000 locomotives along with 11,000 railcars to help ship goods and equipment from factories to the front.

M3A1 Stuart tank and a piece of A-20 bomber hull. Stuarts were shipped to the Soviet Union from the start of polar convoys in 1942 till April 1943. U.S. National Archives and Records Administration

Additionally, over the course of the war, the Americans delivered over 400,000 trucks and other vehicles to the USSR. During the same period, Soviet factories produced less than 200,000. Given the size and scope of the challenges in the vast Russian steppe, trucks were key in moving various classes of supply and labor over hundreds of miles. After the war, even Premier Nikita Khrushchev reported that the USSR was dependent on Western vehicles for its tactical advances in Stalingrad and Berlin. So prevalent were American designs that they remained part of Red Army equipment sets for years after the war. Even versions of the famous “Katyusha” rocket launchers used by the Red Army were often placed upon American-built Studebaker US6 2.5-ton trucks. The American vehicle became the standard mount for the 1,800 BM-13N Katyusha models produced. Soviet soldiers were so impressed with the quality and performance of American vehicles that the term “Studebaker” became synonymous with excellence. Khrushchev, who succeeded Stalin, recalled, “After Stalin’s death it seemed that all our artillery was mounted on American equipment.”

Staving Off Famine

While unheralded, perhaps the most important contribution of Lend-Lease was agricultural. Even before the war, Stalin’s domestic policies resulted in food shortages across the USSR with an estimated five million people dying from starvation, and Soviet food stocks were insufficient even before the 1941 Nazi invasion. Such shortages were exacerbated as the Wehrmacht occupied the most productive Soviet farmlands in Ukraine and the northern Caucasus. These occupied areas previously produced or housed 38 percent of the grain, 84 percent of sugar supplies, 60 percent of sunflower oil, 38 percent of the cattle, and 60 percent of the hogs. Adding to the country’s agricultural woes, many of the horses used in farming were commandeered for military use while tractor production was reconverted for armored or tracked vehicles. Furthermore, farmhands and manual labor became scarce as the nation mobilized its population to either fill its military ranks or employ workers in war-related industries. Reflecting the occupation and its effects on Soviet agriculture, grain production fell from 95 million tons in 1940 to 29 million in 1942. In conjunction, all elements of Russian agriculture suffered, with potato production falling from 75 million tons to 23 million tons, and meat declining from a prewar figure of 4.7 million tons to 1.8 million.

Preparing canned pork (Russian: "svinaia tushonka") for lend-lease shipment to the USSR at the Kroger grocery and baking company. One pound of pork, lard, onions, and spice go into each can. Photographer: Howard R. Hollem. Cincinnati, Ohio, June 1943. Library of Congress 2017856917

As a result, the prewar food shortages continued and remained endemic among Soviet populations. Even with food shortages prior to the war, official government figures claim that food consumption dropped 35 to 40 percent during the conflict. Wartime rationing started in July 1941, and by 1943 food was so scarce that in some areas civilians reportedly ate grass, roots, and leaves. Sustenance was certainly a critical concern in keeping the USSR in the fight. Reflecting their dire situation, from 1942–43 food was the top Soviet priority for Lend-Lease deliveries.

Underscoring its importance while helping to stave off famine, a full quarter of Lend-Lease tonnage sent to the USSR throughout the war was food. While most of the American 4.4 million tons provided subsistence went to the Red Army, it allowed for domestic production to feed civilian populations. In the first few months of 1943, American produce alone accounted for 17 percent of Red Army calories along with half the fats consumed by uniformed personnel. Adding protein to the Red Army diet was Hormel Foods, which provided its signature tin-packed SPAM canned pork and ham products. By 1944, the USSR’s food crises abated some as occupied territories were liberated but still required the planting season to fully reap the bounty. Despite the slow recovery, the Red Army and the USSR were at critical point regarding sustenance. Lend-Lease again helped fill that gap. Even Khrushchev quipped that “without SPAM, we should not have been able to feed our army.”

A Decisive Impact  

While Soviet historians downplay the Lend-Lease effort, perhaps the most telling indication regarding the importance of American assistance came from the USSR’s own senior leadership. As early as 1943 at the Tehran Conference, Stalin reportedly said: “The most important things in this war are machines. … The United States is a country of machines. Without the machines we received through lend-lease, we would have lost the war.” By late 1943, Stalin acknowledged that Lend-Lease already had a decisive impact on the Soviet Union’s survival. Massive aid would then enable Soviet counteroffensives. Khrushchev credited the trucks and equipment received after Stalingrad with enabling the Soviet mechanized offensives of 1944 and 1945, observing: “Our losses would have been colossal because we would have had no maneuverability.”

A company of American-supplied M3 Lee Lend-Lease tanks advances to the frontline of the 6th Guards Army during the Battle of Kursk. The tanks belong to the 193rd Separate Tank Regiment, 48th Army. Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation 

While the victory over the Axis was indeed an international effort, in the center of struggle was the bounty produced not only in American factories, but in the fields of its farms and ranches. Despite being overlooked in many circles, the foundation for victory on the Eastern Front had much of its roots in the United States. Such sentiment was echoed by Khrushchev declaring in his memoirs: “If the United States had not helped us, we would not have won the war,” continuing that “we shouldn't boast that we vanquished the Germans all by ourselves.”