Top Photo: Iwo Jima, February 23, 1945: Marines risk sniper fire atop Mount Suribachi as they gather to the great attraction of the day—5th Division Marines raise the American flag. Photo by Marine Pvt. Bob Campbell. National Archives identifier: 100310761.  

On March 4, 1945, a Boeing B-29 Superfortress bomber nicknamed Dinah Might was running low on fuel. Part of the US Army Air Forces’ 313th Bomb Wing stationed at Tinian, the plane was returning from a raid over Japan and in the vicinity of the island of Iwo Jima. The pilot, First Lieutenant Fred Malo, had three options. He could ditch the plane and crew into the ocean, or have the crew bail out by the nearby island and make for the shoreline. His third option was landing at the recently captured Motoyama Airfield #1 near the base of Mount Suribachi on Iwo Jima. The small eight-square-mile island housed the Japanese-built airfield, along with a second completed field in the island’s center and a third under construction. With US Marines still engaged in deadly combat with Japanese forces, Malo chose the third option and landed at Airfield #1. Hitting a field telephone pole while on final approach, the plane safely reached terra firma. As enemy troops fired at the shiny bomber hoping to score a hit, the crew quickly repaired a faulty fuel valve. After some 30 minutes, the Superfortress lumbered back into the air and continued home. As Marines cheered the plane’s departure, what they did not know is that Dinah Might’s was the first of many emergency landings.

Nicknamed Dinah Might this B-29 Superfortress was the first to use Iwo Jima for an emergency landing. The bomber landed on March 4, 1045, while Japanese troops still contested the island. (USMC Photo)

In the annals of US Marine Corps history, few battles resonate like that of Iwo Jima. The island’s hellish landscape included molten sulfur and steam, easily defendable terrain, miles of underground tunnels, dangerous surf, and hundreds of hidden fighting positions housing a fanatical, suicidal foe. The name for this small spit of land in the Pacific literally means “sulfur island,” described by an Imperial staff officer as a place with “no water, no sparrow, no swallow.” Lying within the Japanese inner defensive zone, Iwo Jima sits at almost equal distance between Tokyo and the American bombers based in the Marianas. Code-named Operation Detachment, the landing aimed to achieve several objectives: remove the enemy garrison providing early warning of inbound B-29 strikes, eliminate Japanese nuisance air raids over the Marianas, establish an emergency airfield for aircrews, protect the American right flank for the invasion of Okinawa, and provide a location for fighter aircraft escorting bombing missions over the home islands. For such a small island, it held significant strategic importance.

Much of Iwo Jima’s terrain in the north was composed of canyons, crevices, and caves such as these. Japanese troops used this natural terrain for well-placed defensive positions. Japanese light tank model 95 emplaced to fire down drop crevice. Photographed by Kauffman, March 1945. Official U.S. Marine Corps photograph, now in the collections of the National Archives.

Shaped like a pork chop, the island’s southern part was dominated by the 550-foot-tall extinct volcano Mount Suribachi, with an accompanying isthmus that gradually widened with relatively flat terrain. To the north and wider part of the island, the topography changed in elevation and was littered with caves, cliffs, and canyons. Suitable landing beaches were located on the southern end of the island but were bracketed by Suribachi on one end and rising escarpments on the other. Given the small size of the island and its associated terrain, the Marines and sailors of the landing force were always within easy sight and range of prepared Japanese defenses. Suribachi provided clear fields of fire into the rear of the Marine beachhead, and the whole island bristled with guns and artillery housed in hundreds of block houses. These defensive positions were connected by miles of underground tunnels and manned by over 20,000 Japanese troops.

Lieutenant General Tadamichi Kuribayashi, the Japanese commander on Iwo Jima, realized the changing nature of the war and fully appreciated the Americans’ superiority in both material and firepower. Knowing US air and naval fires would destroy prepared beachline defenses, he had most of his guns and fighting positions placed inland in concealed locations. With his defenses placed off the shoreline, Kuribayashi also had his troops withhold their fire to further prevent their destruction from pre-landing fires. Because there would be little air and no naval support, he expertly designed defenses leveraging the island’s terrain. Kuribayashi knew that Japanese forces would never fully defeat or repel the American invaders; victory for him and his command lay in inflicting as many US casualties as possible. He forbade fanatical and wasteful banzai attacks and instead focused on well-concealed defensive positions, nightly infiltrations, organized counterattacks, and interlocking fields of fire to demoralize Marines and frustrate American advances. Even with such well-laid plans, he understood the suicidal nature of his mission, writing his wife, “The Americans will surely invade this Iwo Jima … do not look for my return.”

All three Marine Division commanders on Iwo Jima, from left: Major General Keller E. Rockey, 5th Marine Division; Major General Graves B. Erskine, 3rd Marine Division; and Major General Clifton B. Cates, 4th Marine Division. (US Naval History and Heritage Command)

Assaulting the island was V Amphibious Corps under the command of Major General Harry Schmidt. Consisting of the 3rd, 4th, and 5th Marine Divisions, it was the largest force of Marines employed in a single battle. After debating the size of the landing force and the beaches for the initial assault, Marine leadership chose to land two divisions abreast on the southeast side of the island. Once ashore, most of the associated regiments would push inland and then swing to the north while seizing Airfield No. 1. At 0645 on February 19, the 4th and 5th Marine Divisions under Major Generals Clifton Cates and Keller Rocky were ordered to “land the landing force.” The 5th Mar Marine Division’s 27th and 28th Marine Regiments were assigned the southernmost beaches of Red 1, Red 2, and Green, while the 4th Division’s 23rd and 24th Regiments were ordered to the north at Yellow 1, Yellow 2, and Blue 1. With the 3rd Division under Major General Graves Erskine in reserve, the plan was for the 28th Regiment to seize the isthmus connecting Suribachi and clear the volcano with the 27th moving further north taking the southern part of Airfield No. 1. Simultaneously, regiments of the 4th Division were to head to the center of the airfield and then push north toward Airfield No. 2.

V Corps landing plan for Iwo Jima. The landing beaches were bracketed with Mount Suribachi to the south and a rising escarpment near the rock quarry to the north. (USMC History Division Map)

The Iwo Jima landings included the use of combined arms from the various services. Sixteen days before the Marines landed, B-24 Liberator bombers from the US Army Air Force’s Seventh Air Force began hitting the island, flying over 500 sorties and dropping over 1,000 tons of bombs. In addition to the heavy bomber assault, Schmidt originally requested 10 days of naval surface fire support to strike Iwo Jima’s 700 “hard” targets. However, naval leaders rejected the request on account of ship availability and ammunition limitations. After haggling over naval fires, and much to the Marine’s chagrin, the Navy provided only three days of pre-landing support. Despite this shortfall in surface fires, Marine and Navy aircraft from Task Force 58 aircraft also struck targets on the island.

On D-Day, February 19, ship-to-shore movement was executed as scheduled. With H-Hour set for 0900, the first wave of 68 amphibious tractors (amtracs) made its way to the line of departure 4,000 yards offshore. While the vehicles proceeded to the beaches as scheduled, the Marines soon found movement problematic upon landing. The incline off the beach was too steep, forcing the amtracs to unload troops between the waterline and the first terrace. Furthermore, once offloaded, foot mobility was difficult as the beaches’ black volcanic ash swallowed an individual’s foot up to the ankle. One Marine described it as “trying to run in loose coffee grounds.” Despite these challenges, approximately 6,000 Marines came ashore in the first few minutes.

Adding to the mobility problem, follow-on waves came in on landing craft that had trouble navigating the island’s rough surf. Rolling waves rocked the vessels, with many broaching, making debarkation difficult. While individual movement was difficult in the island’s black ash, vehicles sent ashore had similar problems and quickly sunk up to their wheel hubs. On the shoreline, amphibious trucks and landing craft hauling follow-on waves of Marines and vital supplies wallowed in a raging surf. Floundering, abandoned, and wrecked landing craft along with stuck vehicles began to litter the beach, creating an amphibious traffic jam. With equipment unable to scale the ashy incline and landing craft awash in the surf, empty beach space became scarce, slowing the introduction of tanks and artillery. Adding to the problem, once the first waves had made it ashore, Kuribayashi’s artillery fire and defensive positions finally opened up on the landing force. With Japanese artillery already pre-sighted on the invasion beaches, enemy rounds landed with great precision. Given the growing congestion on the shoreline, a rough surf, coupled with the inbound Japanese fire, the landing beaches were in chaos.

With a rough surf, poor trafficability, and incoming Japanese fire, the beaches of Iwo Jima quickly became awash in abandoned and damaged American equipment. (USNHHC)

Having only positioned one battalion near the landing beaches and airfield, the bulk of Kuribayashi’s forces remained in well-concealed fighting positions and caves to the north. Given the enemy dispositions, the Marines made good progress inland with a rolling barrage of fire preceding their advance. Despite the naval fires, many enemy pillboxes remained around the base of Suribachi, at Airfield No. 1, and on the right flank in the 25th Marine Regiment zone. As Marines pushed inland, more and more Japanese pillboxes and fighting positions remained intact, with defenses stiffening and progress slowing.

Despite withering fire from Suribachi’s defenders, the 28th Marines landed on Green Beach in the south and reached the island’s western shore. Advancing some 700 yards, at around 1030 they cut off Suribachi from the rest of the island. On the 28th’s right flank, the 27th Marines pushed in from the Red Beaches and slowly progressed to the southern parts of Airfield No. 1. During this action, enemy indirect fire killed the hero of Guadalcanal, Gunnery Sergeant John Basilone, as a mortar shell landed as he moved toward the airfield.

At the Yellow Beaches on the right flank, 23rd Marines moved only 300 yards inland and received significant enemy fire from Japanese positions near the “rock quarry.” While enemy artillery fire was deadly and accurate, forward observers on established radio networks helped reduce the incoming threat by directing naval fire and air support at the Japanese artillery. With effective radio communication, slowly the Americans began to reduce the enemy’s guns and positions. Despite the effective use of combined arms, casualties mounted. By early afternoon, both division commanders committed their reserves, and at the end of the first day, the landing force had experienced an 8 percent casualty rate, with 2,420 dead or wounded. Despite these losses, V Corps landed 30,000 Marine ashore and held a beachhead perimeter over 4,000 yards wide and 1,000 deep.

With the 28th Marines landing at Green Beach and securing the island’s isthmus that first day, Mount Suribachi (or “hot rocks,” as the Marines nicknamed it) still needed to be taken. Despite the pre-landing bombardment, Colonel Kanehiko Atsuchi’s 2,000-man semiautonomous detachment remained largely intact and embedded in the mountain’s caves and tunnels, which housed machine gun nests, observation posts, and large-caliber weapons. Clearing them out would be a dangerous, laborious process. The mountain’s base was surrounded by 70 pillboxes and smaller positions were located throughout, and Kuribayashi expected Atsuchi’s command to hold out for at least 10 days. Even approaching the geographic feature came at a price with a Marine killed for every yard gained. As one survivor recounted, “It was terrible, the worst I can remember us taking. The [Japanese] mortarmen seem to be playing checkers and using us as squares.” Slowly making it up the incline by D+4, the regiment was positioned to secure the hot rocks summit. On the morning of February 23, Company E, 2nd Battalion, moved out. Taking out defenders still in spider holes, they made their way to the top, and by 1020, they planted the first US flag on the mount. Observed by much of the landing force, when the flag went up everyone cheered, ship horns blared, and sirens blew. Some recalled that men openly wept at the sight. Three hours later, an even larger flag was raised, a moment made famous by Associated Press reporter Joe Rosenthal’s iconic photograph Raising the Flag on Iwo Jima. While securing the summit was inspirational and motivating, for the Marines on the island it also had a very practical value. It allowed the placement of flash ranging, counterbattery fire equipment capable of locating Japanese guns still active in the island’s northern reaches.

The first flag raising on Suribachi received a cheer from all who saw it. Later that day the iconic second flag raising was captured by Joe Rosenthal. (USNHHC)

Even with Suribachi in American hands ahead of Kuribayashi’s timetable, most of the Japanese garrison remained in the island’s northern recesses. In addition to his army formations, Kuribayashi counted on support from Rear Admiral Toshinosuke Ichimaru’s 5,000-man naval infantry formations. In a rare instance of Japanese interservice cooperation, the two officers worked together to decimate American forces. Given the Japanese dispositions, their experience of the battle was equally painful. In their unground positions on a volcanic island, the heat became excruciating with the added misery of American bombs and artillery landing continuously overhead. Lacking drinking water, thirst was a constant companion as they waited for the inevitable and were told that their fighting positions would eventually become their graves.

The same day Suribachi fell, Schmidt started his offensive north and committed his Corps reserve, bringing the 3rd Marine Division ashore. On D+5, V Corps moved toward the Motoyama Plateau, with all three divisions abreast—the 5th on the left, 3rd in the center as the main effort, and 4th on the right. To disrupt the Marine offensive, the Japanese conducted effective company-sized spoiling attacks. In addition, Japanese forces also employed large-caliber 150-mm howitzers and 120-mm mortars with deadly accuracy. As one senior Marine recalled, “The [Japanese] could snipe with those big guns.” Moreover, these big weapons could easily range the American rear areas, giving no respite to those evacuated from the front lines. Continuing to make things difficult, Japanese troops remained in their underground positions, making effective use of cover and concealment. As one Marine commented, “The [Japanese] weren’t on Iwo Jima. … They were in Iwo Jima.”

Helping in the drive north and after securing Airfield No. 1, Marine observation aircraft came ashore and helped call in supporting arms. In their small OY-1 or -2 planes, they bravely orbited over troops on the ground, calling in fires on the Japanese guns. Alone, unarmed, and subject to enemy fire, these aircrews provided invaluable service to their brethren on the ground. Often even the presence of these tiny, unarmed aircraft was enough for the enemy to button up in silence.

Flamethrowers were required to clear out Japanese defenders using the island’s caves as fighting positions. Signal Corps Archive

Pushing north, each Marine Division encountered stiff resistance at specific locations within their zones of action. The 4th on the right flank struggled at what became known as “Turkey Knob” and the “Amphitheater,” while the 5th found tough going at Nishi Ridge in what the Marines referred to as “the gorge.” Making their way north of Airfield No. 2, the 3rd Marine Division came across a labyrinth of caves and canyons called “Cushman’s Pocket” that required flame throwers to clear out each opening or crevice. For more than a week they pushed north, gaining 4,000 yards at a cost of 7,000 casualties. However, on D+13, March 4, they broke Kuribayashi’s main defensive line, forcing the general to displace his headquarters. Later that day, Dina Might made its inaugural landing at Airfield No. 1, validating the Marines’ efforts.

Clearing out the northern part of the island continued for the next two weeks, with Japanese resistance slowly withering. On March 24, in a last-gasp effort, some 300 Japanese infiltrated into the Marine rear areas occupied by aircrew and logistics personnel, killing or wounding hundreds. The next day, major combat operations came to an end, but enemy holdouts still remained. As the Marines withdrew, US Army forces inherited the mission of clearing out remaining defenders. In the months that followed, American soldiers killed over 1,000 Japanese and captured 800 more.

An all-too-common occurrence on Iwo Jima. Marines evacuate wounded off the island in March 1945. (USNNHC)

While General Kuribayashi’s remains were never found, his tactical acumen became widely respected. After the battle, one Marine quipped, “Let’s hope the [Japanese] don’t have any more like him.” In the seizure of Iwo Jima, American forces killed 22,000 Japanese at a cost of over 6,000 Marines and sailors. However, the total US casualty rate stood at over 24,000, or roughly one of every three who landed on the island. The toll on individual units was tremendous. Nineteen of 24 battalion commanders were casualties, while one company of 133 Marines departed the island with only nine remaining. The 5th Marine Division had arrived at Iwo Jima in 22 transports but required only eight when it departed. These staggering losses combined with what was to come on Okinawa (Operation Iceberg) a month later were a warning of what might happen during an invasion of the Japanese home islands.

Highlighting the ferocity of the fighting on Iwo Jima were the 27 Medals of Honor awarded to Marines and sailors. The total represented a fourth of all such medals awarded to the Corps during the war, with half of the V Corps awards done posthumously. Such bravery led Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz to say, “Among the Americans who served on Iwo Island, uncommon valor was a common virtue.” Furthermore, and more importantly, the Marine and Navy sacrifice was not in vain. Over the course of the next few months, over 2,200 American B-29 aircrews used the newly captured island’s runways as emergency airstrips. With a compliment of up to 11 men per bomber, the island saved the lives of over 24,000 airmen. Perhaps the best recognition of the sacrifices made in securing the island came from a B-29 pilot, who said that “whenever I land on that island, I thank god for them who fought for it.”

Fifth Marine Division Marines showing of their captured enemy battle flags and gear. Note the Marine in the center wearing a Japanese army cap. (USNNHC)